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ABSTRACT 
With the spread of terrorism and its growing risks since the start of the 21st 
century, a wide range of reports and studies have emerged. This funding comes from a 
special relationship between terrorist organizations, organized crime syndicates, and their 
cooperation with each other, which has enabled terrorist organizations in particular to 
carry out recruitment efforts and operations alike. It has also fueled an international black 
market for smuggling and trade in drugs and arms. Under what conditions do violent 
terrorist groups driven by extreme Islamist ideology collaborate with organized criminal 
enterprises to generate the requisite resources to pursue their strategic objectives? Given 
that question, this thesis assessed the extent of the validity of the following 
hypothesis/central argument: As Islamist extremist terrorist groups’ financial needs 
increase, they are more likely to use collaboration with organized criminal enterprises, 
relative to other sources, as their principal means of funding. It has also assessed the 
extent of the argument through the presentation of comparative case studies on Western 
Europe and the Sahel of North/West Africa. The findings indicate that the lines of 
demarcation between terrorist groups and criminal organizations operating in both 
Western Europe and the Sahel are becoming increasingly blurred. It could, reasonably, be 
argued that terrorism in Western Europe and the Sahel of North/West Africa is a variant 
of serious organized crime in view of the modus operandi of Islamist extremist 
movements and their mode of financing. 
 
 
 
 iii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would first like to thank Dr. Robert Pauly for accompanying me from the 
very first beginnings of this adventure. His support, his enthusiasm for this thesis, his 
availability and confidence have allowed me to move forward serenely. Our 
discussions and advice helped me a lot and impacted this work very strongly.  
  I would like, especially, to thank Dr. Tom Lansford and Dr. Joseph St. Marie 
for accepting to be the committee members of this thesis. My thanks also go to Ms. 
Annette Copeland for her help and advices during this process. 
 
 
 iv 
DEDICATION 
I dedicate this work to my mother, Dr. Robert Pauly, Dr. Deanne Stephens, and 
Dr. Kate Greene. Thank you all for the help and encouragement during my graduate 
study. 
 
 v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................ ii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................................................. iii 
DEDICATION ................................................................................................................... iv 
CHAPTER I- INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 1 
Synopsis of Relevant Literature ...................................................................................... 2 
Methodology ................................................................................................................... 7 
Organizational Structure of Thesis ................................................................................. 8 
CHAPTER II- LITERARURE REVIEW ........................................................................... 9 
Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 9 
Terrorism....................................................................................................................... 10 
Organized Crime ........................................................................................................... 14 
The Nexus between Terrorism and Organized Crime .................................................. 21 
Terrorism And Organized Crime-Similarities And Differences ................................... 32 
Contribution to Existing Literature ............................................................................... 44 
CHAPTER III– METHODOLOGY ................................................................................. 47 
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 47 
Qualitative Comparative Case Study Analysis ............................................................. 48 
Reiteration and Explanation of Central Argument ....................................................... 53 
 vi 
CHAPTER IV– PRESENTATION OF CASE STUDIES -WESTERN EUROPE/SAHEL 
OF NORTH/WEST AFRICA ........................................................................................... 56 
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 56 
Case Study on Western Europe..................................................................................... 56 
Case Study on the North African/Sahel Region ........................................................... 67 
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 67 
CHAPTER V– COMPARTIVE CASE STUDY ANALYSIS ......................................... 79 
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 79 
Analysis of the Case Study of Western Europe ............................................................ 79 
Analysis of the Case Study of the Sahel of North/West Africa .................................... 86 
Similarities Between Western Europe and the Sahel Region ....................................... 92 
Differences Between Western Europe And the Sahel of North/West Africa ............... 95 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 99 
CHAPTER VI- CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................... 100 
Introduction ................................................................................................................. 100 
Assessment of Extent of Validity of Central Argument ............................................. 101 
Limitations of Thesis and Suggestions for Future Research ...................................... 107 
Policy Recommendations............................................................................................ 108 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 111 
 1 
 
CHAPTER I- INTRODUCTION 
The phenomenon of terrorism is manifested in violence, which pervades the 
international system and domestic societies of the states interacting therein. In spite of the 
growing danger of terrorism, there is no universally accepted definition of that term, nor 
is there any domestic consensus on such a definition among governmental institutions in 
the United States. The lack of either American domestic or broader international 
consensus on that issue is hardly surprising, given the range of ideological, theological 
and doctrinal backgrounds involved, with respect to academics, policy makers and 
practitioners and, for that matter, countries and their populations. That lack of consensus, 
in turn, hampers the development of domestic and international legal frameworks and 
conventions to manage the range of threats that terrorist organizations pose. 
Those domestic and international security threats of terrorism have increased 
dramatically over the last three decades generally and especially since the start of the 21st 
century. In fact, September 11, 2001 marks a milestone in the history of transnational 
terrorism with Al Qaeda’s attacks against the United States that day representing a 
significant escalation in the dangers posed by organizations inspired by extreme 
interpretation of Islam in particular. Furthermore, since the events of 9/11, there has been 
a marked increase in the number of terrorist attacks carried out by members and 
supporters of Islamist extremist groups against targets across the Greater Middle East, as 
well as, increasingly, in the West. Such attacks are carried out in very precise and 
sophisticated ways, taking advantage of modern technology, and causing great losses, 
almost equivalent to the losses of regular wars, whether in lives, property or installations. 
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For example, there was an increase in fatalities committed by Sinai Province of the 
Islamic State in Egypt from two in 2016 to five in 2017.  
This thesis addresses the following research question: Under what conditions do 
violent terrorist groups driven by extreme Islamist ideology collaborate with organized 
criminal enterprises to generate the requisite resources to pursue their strategic 
objectives? Given that question, it assesses the extent of the validity of the following 
hypothesis/central argument: As Islamist extremist terrorist groups’ financial needs 
increase, they are more likely to use collaboration with organized criminal enterprises, 
relative to other sources, as their principal means of funding. The dependent variable is 
the choice of funding sources and the independent variable is the increased demand for 
funds. The thesis assesses the extent of the validity of the hypothesis through a 
comparative analysis of the Western European cases to include France, Belgium, the 
United Kingdom, and Spain and the African Sahel region cases of Nigeria, Mali Niger, 
and Algeria. 
Synopsis of Relevant Literature 
With respect to the central issues under consideration in order to assess the extent 
of the validity of the hypothesis, this thesis builds on Tamara Makarenko’s The Crime–
Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay Between Transnational Organised Crime And 
Terrorism, Louise I. Shelly and John T. Picarelli’s Methods And Motives: Exploring 
Links Between Transnational Organized Crime And International Terrorism, John 
Rollins, Liana Sun Wiler and Seth Rosen’s International Terrorism and Transnational 
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Crime: Security Threats, U.S. Policy, and Considerations for Congress, and Justine A 
Rosenthal’s For-Profit Terrorism: The Rise of Armed Entrepreneurs. 
With respect to the history of terrorism in general, Cindy Combs (1997) finds, in 
her book, Terrorism in The Twenty-First Century, that the terrorist phenomenon is more 
complex to conceptualize than it first appears. The ideological interpretations, coupled 
with the will to introduce a demonizing connotation when the term is used by states, blurs 
the tracks.1 Further, Kegley (2003) states that it may be a fault to begin by recalling that 
the use of terror serves to terrorize historically, which, was the role of the organized 
force, at least when one considers a despotic regime. This is still the case in non-
democratic countries. In others, in wartime, terror can be legitimate, including terrorist 
attacks against civilians.2 
Furthermore, Wright (2006) finds that religiously motivated terrorism is 
conceived as a transcendental act. Justified by religious authorities, it gives any license to 
those authors who carry out acts of terrorism.3 The number of victims and their identities 
do not matter. There is no judge above the cause for which the terrorists sacrifice 
themselves. The perpetrators of the first attack against the World Trade Center in 
 
1. Cindy, Combs, Terrorism in The Twenty-First Century (New Jersey: Pearson, 
1997), 10. 
2. Charles, Kegley, The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls 
(New Jersey: Pearson, 2003), 16. 
3. Lawrence, Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda And The Road To 9/11, 
(New York: Vintage Books, 2006), 34. 
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February 1993, which was only partially successful, had beforehand, obtained a fatwa 
from Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, who died in a U.S Federal prison.4 
Gilbert Geis (1996) states that organized crime has always been a phenomenon of 
power, politics and economy. Higher-level criminal organizations and mafia in general, 
generate order, norms, values, identities, subcultures, and belief systems. They modify 
their environment and shape it to their hand in order to constitute the most favorable 
biotope.5 It is also about systems of power that are sometimes hidden and invisible. Ruth 
(1967) explains that organized crime governs rather unseen, but actually governs, both 
side by side and in addition to legal institutions.6 This implies that the criminal power is 
not only economic but political and social. A rooted and territorialized criminal entity 
becomes a political unit. This political unit of criminal nature assumes political functions 
in the controlled territories: settlement of conflicts (justice), deduction of tax (taxation), 
public order (police), assistance to the most disadvantaged citizens (social transfers). For 
example, the Italian mafias must be analyzed as criminal realities intimately related to the 
bourgoisie. Thus, the Sicilian mafia was born in the form of a crime of power, at the top, 
 
4. Bill, Trott, “'Blind Sheikh’ Convicted In 1993 World Trade Bombing Dies In 
U.S. Prison,” REUTERS 2017, accessed September 03, 2018, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-tradecenter-rahman-idUSKBN15X0KU. 
5. Gilbert, Geis, “Violence and Organized Crime,” The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 364 (1966): 90, 
http://www.jstor.org.lynx.lib.usm.edu/stable/1034756. 
6. Henry, Ruth, “Why Organized Crime Thrives,” The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 374 (1967): 116, 
http://www.jstor.org.lynx.lib.usm.edu/stable/1037198. 
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while the Ndrangheta followed the reverse course. The latter grew out of a popular crime 
and was then applied to developing the power of crime.7 
According to Mullins and Wither (2016), the notions of terrorism and organized 
crime have always been ambiguous. In fact, each can designate a form of organization or 
a type of activity, an entity or mode of operation and do so concurrently. Thus, organized 
crime designates both groups both geographically (motorcycle gangs, maras, Cosa nostra 
Siciliana, Los Angeles Bloods and Crips) and as forms of criminal activity (cigarette 
smuggling, public market rigging, extortion of funds, and assassinations). The same goes 
for terrorism, which can be used to label (negatively) political entities, but also, in a less 
subjective way, to describe operational tactics, such as serial assassinations and car 
bombings; the same word can be used to designate an enemy by essentializing and 
demonizing it or to describe tactics of struggle, a method.8 
Hoffman (2017) finds that the archetypal terrorist network with international 
ramifications is the al-Qaeda network, to include the core that originated in Afghanistan 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s and range of Islamist extremist affiliates that have 
emerged since 9/11. Therefore, it is mainly against this network and its numerous 
branches that the global fight against terrorism is organized.9 
 
7. Letizia, Paoli, “The Decline of the Italian Mafia,” In Organized Crime: 
Culture, Markets and Policies (New York: Springer, 2008), 16. 
8. Sam, Mullins & James, Wither, “Terrorism and Organized Crime,” 
Connections 15, no. 3 (2016): 67. Accessed September 03, 2018, 
http://www.jstor.org.lynx.lib.usm.edu/stable/26326452. 
9. Bruce, Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2017), 36. 
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This thesis focuses on religious extremism.  In fact, the rise of religiosity among 
younger generations of Muslims in the developing world as well as the West seems to be 
a phenomenon of great magnitude. The fundamental role of Salafist ideology in the 
process of radicalization is real, especially among the younger generations of Muslims 
across the Greater Middle East and the West. These young people say they have been 
raised religiously and do not report conflicts with their parents about religion. Therefore, 
it is a religious radicalization in an environment that is itself religious. As Jocelyn Cesari 
(2003) notes: “While the social status of their fathers or grandfathers was defined by their 
economic roles, this second generation, born and educated in Europe, forced Western 
governments and societies to confront the cultural and political consequences of 
migration.”10  
Terrorism is a real threat to human existence, civilization and achievements 
throughout the world. It is practiced in the North as practiced in the South, as well as the 
West.11 Moreover, the danger of terrorism is also increasing, given significant growth in 
the number of terrorist organizations that carry out terrorism that involves unlimited 
violence and it is not restricted by law or morals.12  
 
10. Jocelyne, Cesari, “Muslim Minorities in Europe: The Silent Revolution in 
Modernizing Islam: Religion in the Public Sphere in the Middle East and in Europe,” 
Rutgers University 2003, 127.  
11. Anders, Sandberg, “The Five Biggest Threats to Human Existence,” 
The Washington Post 2014, accessed September 04, 2018, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com. 
12. Omar, Lizardo, “Defining and Theorizing Terrorism: A Global Actor- 
Centered Approach,” Journal of World-System Research 14, no.2 (2008): 97, accessed 
September 04, 2018, https://www3.nd.edu/~olizardo/papers/jwsr-defining.pdf.  
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Organized Crime typically involves a very serious criminal organization, in which 
the perpetrator is transformed into a permanent member of a criminal cell, a specialized 
criminal function and a criminal act occupying a function within the criminal 
organization’s structure.13 Such gangs are organized by a criminal organization based on 
a hierarchical cluster structure that includes cluster cells of groups of criminals spread 
throughout the country.14 As the phenomenon of money laundering is part of organized 
crime, it can also be linked to international drug cartels and some businessmen to launder 
their dirty money through the financing of terrorist organizations.15 
This thesis will build upon the concept of hybridization which accounts for 
criminological misbehavior. Two mirroring processes work here: a politicization of crime 
and a criminalization of politics. By way of illustration, the question on narcoterrorism 
will be specifically examined. 
Methodology 
The methodology employed in this thesis is a comparative qualitative case study 
analysis, with emphases on the linkages between Islamist extremist terrorist organizations 
 
13. Pierre, Hauck & Sven, Peterke, “Organized Crime and Gang violence in 
National and International Law,” International Review of The Red Cross 92, no. (878): 
413, accessed September 04, 2018, accessed 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/4e46/0ba56e9b66aad093d2921bd73528b07ade90.pdf. 
14. Rachel, Locke, “Organized Crime, Conflict, and Fragility: A New Approach,” 
IPINST 2012, accessed September 04, 2018, https://www.ipinst.org/wp-
content/uploads/publications/epub_organized_crime_conflict_fragility.pdf. 
15. Carter, Smith, Jeff, Rush & Catherine, Burton, “Street Gangs, Organized 
Crime Groups, and Terrorists,” Research Gate 5, no.1 (2013): 3, accessed September 04, 
2018, 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/297704524_Street_Gangs_Organized_Crime_G
roups_and_Terrorists_Differentiating_Criminal_Organizations. 
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and organized criminal enterprises in Europe (France, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and 
Spain) and North and West Africa (Nigeria, Mali, Niger, and Algeria), respectively. This 
use of the case study is descriptive, exploratory and explanatory, allowing for a 
chronological description of events along with historical analysis. This study 
encompasses the definition of terrorism and organized crime, explores the relationship 
between terrorism and organized crime, and distinguishes the extent to which terrorism 
and organized crime are similar or different from each other. It also explores the 
relationship between terrorist groups and organized criminal groups and tactics, 
particularly money laundering. 
Organizational Structure of Thesis 
The balance of the thesis includes seven chapters, which unfold in the following 
manner. Chapter II reviews the relevant literature on terrorism, organized crime and the 
relationship between the two. Chapter III presents a thorough explanation of the 
qualitative comparative case study approach employed. Chapter IV presents the case 
studies of Western Europe and North Africa/West Africa. Chapter V presents the 
comparative analyses of the case studies drawn from Western Europe and North 
Africa/West Africa. Chapter VI concludes the thesis by assessing the extent of the 
validity of the hypothesis/central argument on the basis of the evidence presented in the 
main chapters and offering policy recommendations on how best to combat terrorism and 
organized crime. 
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CHAPTER II- LITERARURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
Investigations into the links between terrorist groups and organized criminal 
organizations have long been hampered by the idea that these two types of organizations 
pursue different, ultimately irreconcilable objectives, with criminals seeking profits, and 
terrorists driven by ideological goals.16 This dichotomy led some scholars to suggest that 
terrorist groups were unlikely to engage in criminal activity, as it would be contrary to 
their ideological goals.  
But in reality, and for several decades, there have been intersections and common 
interests between criminal organizations and terrorist organizations. By the 1980s, when 
Pablo Escobar and the Colombian drug cartels in Medellin and Cali were in full swing, 
experts defined “narcoterrorism” and considered whether it was a concrete example of 
permeability between the criminal world and the terrorist world. Similarly, it is widely 
acknowledged that the aims pursued by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, a group that 
has been smuggling cigarettes and counterfeit goods since its creation, are sometimes 
criminal, sometimes ideological.17 
 
16. “Similarities and Differences Between Organized Crime And Other Forms Of 
Crime,” UNODC 2018, accessed January 18, 2019, 
https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/organized-crime/module-1/key-issues/similarities-and-
differences.html. 
17. “Political Stability and Security in West and North Africa,” accessed January 
18, 2019, https://www.canada.ca/en/security-intelligence-
service/corporate/publications/political-stability-and-security-in-west-and-north-
africa.html. 
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This chapter explains that with the fall of the implosion of the Soviet Union in 
1991, there has been a marked reduction in state-sponsored financing of terrorism: “The 
end of the Cold War also altered the calculations of the few nations identified by the 
United States as sponsors of terrorism. It reduced support from and protection by the 
Soviet Union—as in Syria, a patron of the Palestinians.”18 As a result, terrorist 
organizations found themselves in a critical situation, lacking resources: they used serious 
crime as a substitute means of financing. Today, there are certainly myriad examples of 
organized crime outside terrorism, but there is no longer a global terrorist organization 
without contact with criminal networks. There is even an incorporation of transnational 
crime networks into the terrorist organization. The chapter reviews the existing literature 
on terrorism, organized crime, and the nexus between terrorism and organized crime.  
The organizational structure of the chapter follows this order respectively: 
Terrorism, Organized crime, the Nexus between Terrorism and Organized Crime, 
Terrorism and Organized Crime-Similarities and Differences, and Contribution to 
Existing Literature. 
Terrorism 
With the exception of inter- and intra-state wars, there is no worse form of 
political violence than terrorism. Terrorist violence, like war, reached its peak in the 
 
18. Brian, Jenkins, “The New Age of Terrorism,” Rand Organization 2006, 122, 
accessed March 12, 2019, 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reprints/2006/RAND_RP1215.pdf. 
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twentieth century, so much so that no country was totally spared from it19: “Organizations 
that carried out terrorist attacks in the United States often engaged in other types of legal 
and illegal behavior. Seventy-nine of these groups participated in non-violent political 
activities, and 55 carried out conventional crimes in addition to terrorist violence.”20 It is 
a heinous act that has accompanied humanity for millennia. If the term “terrorism” is 
new, the phenomenon itself is old; the word has been used so widely that it now often 
refers to very different realities, sometimes far removed from what it originally covered. 
Paul Pillar (2001) finds that like all political phenomena, terrorism is defined by 
the duality between a set of proclaimed ideals and their implementation. And like all 
political phenomena, terrorism exists only in a cultural and historical context. For three 
decades, the effects of Marxist ideology on terrorist movements has married the fortunes 
of the latter; today, terrorist groups with Marxist motivations are a clear minority, 
whereas they were predominant in the 1970s and 1980s.21  
Furthermore, in his article “Definition of Terrorism – Social and Political 
Effects,” Gregor Bruce explains that the definition of terrorism is still controversial. 
However, it is on the political plane that the differences are apparent, because what one 
state perceives and characterizes as terrorism, another does not. Each state explains the 
 
19. Erik, Männik, “Terrorism:  Its Past, Present And Future Prospects,” KSK 
2011, 2, accessed January 18, 2019, https://www.ksk.edu.ee/wp-
content/uploads/2011/03/KVUOA_Toimetised_12-Männik.pdf. 
20. “Profiles of Perpetrators of Terrorism in the United States, 1970-2013,” DHS 
2014, 4, accessed April 27, 2019, 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/OPSR_TP_TEVUS_Profiles-of-
Perpetrators-of-Terrorism-US-1970-2013-Report_2014Dec-508.pdf. 
21. Paul, Pillar, Terrorism And U.S Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2001), 42. 
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phenomenon, according to its national interests. At the doctrinal level, the phenomenon is 
defined more or less identically, except that some authors remove its political 
characteristic.22 
Richard Jackson (2008) notes that terrorism is a criminal phenomenon that 
threatens the whole of mankind as long as it aims not only for the destruction of property, 
but also serious and dangerous harm to civilians and members of the military alike, 
regardless of their sex, age, religion or race. It does not only concern underdeveloped or 
developing states, but also highly developed states in the American and European 
continents.23 
Hoffman (1999) emphasizes the importance of cultural factors in motivating 
religiously inspired terrorist movements, more than those driven by strictly ideological or 
nationalist movements. Groups such as Al Qaeda, the Islamic State and their many 
affiliates mix political or pseudo-political aspirations (the destruction of Israel or the 
United States) with extreme and often perverted interpretations of Islam that prove useful 
for recruiting purposes and is, therefore, similar to the ideological element of other 
movements.24 
 
22. Gregor, Bruce, “Definition of Terrorism – Social and Political 
Effects,”Journal Of Military And Veterans’ Health 21, no.2, accessed January 18, 2019, 
https://jmvh.org/article/definitionof-terrorism-social-and-political-effects. 
23. Richard, Jackson, “An Argument For Terrorism,” Perspectives On Terrorism 
2, no.2 (2008): 25-32, accessed January 18, 2019, https://www-jstor-
org.lynx.lib.usm.edu/stable/pdf/26298330.pdf?refreqid=search%3A33806d123ecde4e5e6
210642c66421d4. 
24. Bruce, Hoffman, “Revival Of Religious Terrorism Begs The Broader U.S 
Policy,” RAND 1999, accessed January 17, 2019, accessed via 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/periodicals/rand-review/issues/rr-winter98-9/methods.html. 
 13 
 
There are few similarities between terrorist organizations and the governments of 
the states in the international system. The nature of this opposition often defines the 
character of a given terrorist movement. Where states are mainly rational actors, terrorist 
movements often have a strongly emotional characters. J. Corllett (1997) explains that 
where the modern state apparatus operates on the principles of a “realist” policy and on 
the basis of maintaining stability in the international system through the balance of 
power, terrorist movements emphasize a strong moral current (whose code varies 
according to the employed ideology) and a weak-to-strong strategy that focuses on the 
psychological effects inflicted on the adversary.25 Raymond Aron (1966) expressed this 
phenomenon incisively in the following terms: “A violent action is denominated terrorist 
when its psychological effects are out of proportion with its purely physical results”26. 
Michael Moran (2006) finds that Western tradition considers legitimate only the 
violence practiced by the state. This restrictive conception of the use of terror does not 
focus on those who do not have other means to try to reverse a situation deemed 
oppressive because the legitimacy of a terrorist action manifests itself through the 
objectives of these agents.27 Studies drawing on interviews of former terrorists suggest 
 
25. J, Corlett, “Can Terrorism Be Morally Justified,” Public Affairs Quaterly 10, 
no. 3 (1996):170, accessed January 17, 2019, accessed via https://www-jstor-
org.lynx.lib.usm.edu/stable/pdf/40435951.pdf?refreqid=search%3A97cdc8a150db8ad26b
f09ef9ea54b790. 
26. Chalmers, Johnson, “Perspectives On Terrorism,” 3, California University 
Berkeley 1980, accessed January 16, 2019, accessed through 
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a081201.pdf. 
27. Michael, Moran, “Terrorist Groups and Political Legitimacy,” CFR 2006, 
accessed January 17, 2019, accessed via https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/terrorist-
groups-and-political-legitimacy. 
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that the idea of “the end justifies the means” is at the base of most terrorist actions. It is 
the cause of the terrorist movement rather than its mode of action that is likely to be 
considered moral.28 
Organized Crime 
Organized crime is a paradoxical object. To the extent that the perpetration of a 
crime is an event, it is theoretically possible to observe its progress. Therefore, the 
membership of an offense under the organized crime category is the product of 
knowledge and not an observation, and, hence, the importance of identifying the sources 
of that knowledge. Knowledge about organized crime is characterized by both its 
abundance and its scarcity.29 As on the terrorism, there is a growing plethora of alarming 
works which rely on sources of the last hand, of which the validity is not controlled. On 
the other hand, the works with a scientific character which rely on rigorous data are few 
in number. 
One of the oldest notions of the criminal law is that of premeditation which turns 
into a consultation when two people unite to commit a crime. From a lone criminal act to 
organized criminal enterprise, there is only one step. It is vain to attempt to lengthen this 
step by substituting the word “crime” for that of crime to produce a clear distinction 
between organized crime and an event crime. The overlaps between the content of 
 
28. John, Cohan, “Necessity, Political Violence And Terrorism,” Stetson 2006, 
accessed January 17, 2019, accessed via 
https://www.stetson.edu/law/lawreview/media/necessity-political-violence-and-
terrorism.pdf. 
29. Gilbert, Geis, “Violence And Organized Crime,” The Annals of The American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 364 (1996): 86, 
http://www.jstor.org.lynx.lib.usm.edu/stable/1034756. 
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notions such as premeditation, concertation, and organization actually show that they are 
imprecise. It is not judicious to add to this inaccuracy by classifying under one and the 
same kind all forms of crime that are likely to have a collective author.30 
Even if the rapprochement between these delinquencies can be proved in some 
light, it is necessary to renounce embracing at the same time terrorism, delinquency, 
professions (for example, medical delinquency), criminality of businesses and organized 
crime later to unite these concepts after having adequately distinguished them. Not only 
there is no definition of organized crime at the moment, but many doubt that it is possible 
to produce one.31 Most of the definitions are very prolix, such as the one proposed by the 
United Nations, which is based on a paragraph including excerpts of no less than five 
international conventions.32 
A current strategy adopted as much by researchers and jurists as by practitioners 
is to formulate a set of traits specific to a criminal organization: organized crime is then 
conceived as the product of such an organization, characterized by its possession of a part 
or all of the listed traits. The list most frequently quoted is that of the Council of the 
 
30. Roland, Chilton, “The Homicide Research Working Groups’s First Five 
Years: What Has Been Done? What Needs To Be Done,” NCJRS, 12, accessed 
November 17, 2018, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/166149.pdf. 
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European Union, updated to 1999.33 Organized would be the fact of organizations 
possessing the following traits: 
1/ A collaboration between more than two people 
2/ (involving) specific tasks assigned to each of them 
3/ over a relatively long or indefinite period 
4/ with a form of discipline or control 
5/ suspected of committing serious criminal offenses 
6/ acting at international level 
7/ resorting to violence or other means of intimidation 
8/ using commercial structures 
9/ engaging in money laundering 
10/ influencing political circles, the media, the administration, the public, the judiciary or 
the economy 
11/ acting for power or profit 
All of these traits show how misleading the passive expression of “organized” 
crime can be. In fact, the majority of these traits are stated in the present participle, which 
indicates that this type of crime is less organized than it is organized.34 This list contains 
several flaws in many ways. Some of the traits it contains are overdetermined. In this 
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respect, feature 10 uses the polyvalent notion of influence, which can be interpreted as 
corruption according to whether it is exercised on the apparatus of the State or as 
subversion (or infiltration) when it is exerted on the legal economy. 
The concomitance of these two practices can produce effects of economic and 
social destabilization that are more or less sensitive according to their magnitude. Traits 2 
and 4-the specialization of tasks and discipline-remain unclear as to the hierarchical 
nature of the criminal organization (the presence of this character is the issue of sustained 
debate). Predictably, the list is incomplete: several researchers insist on the willingness of 
these organizations to exercise a monopoly on one or more traffickings in a given 
territory. This willingness is manifested by the endemic conflicts between these 
organisms. 
The decisive test for this list is its contemporaneity. It is agreed that organized 
criminality is a specifically modern phenomenon, the first manifestations of which were 
identified, in the early 1930s in the United States, as gangsterism.35 Piracy is one of the 
oldest forms of crime. All the above-mentioned features, except 4, apply to it. Therefore, 
it is among those that do not apply as such to piracy: the use of commercial-type 
structures, money laundering, corruption, and the infiltration of the legal economy, that 
can be found to be one of the keys to the specificity of organized crime, namely its 
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transactional nature.36 Indeed, piracy is a form of predation, while organized crime is a 
delinquency of supply, which in this respect takes an original place alongside the two 
main traditional types of delinquency: the delinquency against property and against 
people. Even if theft plays a significant role in organized crime (for example, large 
networks of theft and concealment of motor vehicles or works of art), the bulk of these 
operations involve the resale of huge profits from products that were first bought from 
those who produce them (drugs, weapons), who obtain them (poaching of threatened 
species) or who have custody of them (nuclear materials).37 
Similarly, even if organized crime is characterized by its violence, it only uses it 
in an instrumental and relatively parsimonious way, since it harms business. Therefore, 
one could conclude that much of the organized crime consists of unlawful activities of 
supplying goods or services that are partially or wholly prohibited and in the illicit 
recycling of profits from such traffic. The main markets exchanging people (prostitution 
and slavery), organs, animals living or hunting for a part of their body (skin, ivory, horn), 
and various raw products or manufactures (drugs, alcohol, cigarettes, weapons and 
various substances whose circulation is prohibited or impeded).38 The most frequent 
services historically were protection and mediation; they now reside in the illegal passage 
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of immigrants and the manufacture of false papers. In this perspective, organized crime 
would appear as the continuation of economic trade by other means.  
During the 1990s, the concept of organized crime met with considerable success 
and circulated in many professional circles. An impressive list of scholarly books, peer 
reviewed articles, specialized magazines, websites, study centers and research centers 
were devoted to it. In fact, Berry (2003) contends that organized crime, which is an old 
phenomenon, finds a favorable ground for expansion with the globalization of the 
economy and the development of intercultural communication. Consequently, organized 
crime in its various forms, namely drug trafficking, trafficking in human organs, 
trafficking in nuclear substances and weapons, including firearms, smuggling of 
migrants, the opening and management of places of prostitution, corruption, laundering 
of proceeds of crime and terrorism, worries the international community.39 
 In addition, Beare and Naylor (1999) find that the purpose of these crimes is not 
only economic and financial, procuring colossal sums to their authors, but also political. 
The progression of organized crimes poses economic, political and security threats to 
international society.40 Therefore, in order to combat organized crime as a global scourge, 
many states, favor close cooperation in response. The adoption of certain international 
instruments in this field is precisely the result of this international cooperation. 
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 Phil Williams (2009) explains that organized crime can be viewed from a political 
point of view, as some criminal organizations use violence to bend states to their 
demands. Terrorism is the best-known example. They may also have their own assets 
seized, as for criminal organizations that seek significant profits through organized 
international criminal enterprises.41 Therefore, they can control the economy of the states 
by investing in different sectors and at the same time committing other crimes. Drug 
trafficking, for example, endangers public health and hygiene, but also includes other 
offenses associated with the activities of a given organization. The international 
community, having become aware of the harmful consequences of this crime, mobilized 
itself from the beginning of the 20th century by adopting in 1912 the International 
Convention against Opium.42 
 According to Europol, more than 5,000 “organized criminal groups”, most of 
them transnational, were being investigated within European Union (EU) member states 
in 2017. “You have the famous Italian, Russian or Chinese mafias” explains Fabrice 
Rizzoli, doctor of political science and author of the book The Mafia From A to Z. “But 
you also have bikers in the Scandinavian countries, who are biker criminalized groups as 
the Hells Angels or the big traffickers. Spanish drug gangs, the gangs that distribute it in 
the UK, or the big German launderers, are just as dangerous,” he explains. “The mafia 
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would not exist without the accomplices bankers, lawyers, judges, entrepreneurs, 
politicians ...”43 In fact, criminal revenues from illicit trafficking in drugs and tobacco, 
counterfeiting, VAT fraud and cargo theft, are worth 110 billion euros a year in Europe, 
according to Transcrime. This Italian research center, of several universities, published, 
in 2015, a Portfolio of organized crime in Europe, devoted to its infiltration of the legal 
economy via money laundering.44 
The Nexus between Terrorism and Organized Crime 
During the Cold War, terrorism was a game with clearly established and quite 
rational rules. Its actors were clearly identified by their understandable motivations and 
methods. States used terrorist tactics to circumvent the “Nuclear Maginot line”. At that 
historical juncture, terrorism was an instrument of “coerced diplomacy” reporting more 
on the dialogue than pure war. As for terrorist organizations, often linked to states, they 
evolve in theoretical and operational controlled frameworks. The emblematic figures of 
this type of terrorism included the late Libyan leader Moammar Khadafi and Syrian 
President Hafez al-Assad.  
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With the end of the bipolar confrontation, all these certainties disappeared. Yet, 
some “political” actors have committed brutal criminal acts. Examples include the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, Front Libération of Corsica, Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam, Workers’ Party of Kurdistan. And some, criminal actors have been 
“politicized” to the point of growing more reliant on terrorist tactics (Cosa Nostra, drug 
cartels in Latin America, and Chinese Triads, for instance.).45  
Therefore, terrorism has become commonplace, democratized, destructured and 
largely de-ideologized, to the point of contaminating entities hitherto remote from such 
practices especially sectarians, ecologists, and trade unions. These new politico-criminal 
actors are now more unpredictable, and their violence has taken on a partly irrational 
dimension. In short, terrorism was a purely political tool that has also become an ordinary 
criminal instrument.46  
In fact, the line of demarcation between the bandit and the terrorist/guerrilla has 
not stopped fading. Distinctions multiply perpetually. The first breach appeared in the 
1980s with the notion of narcoterrorism: A new expression was needed to describe an 
unprecedented phenomenon, which manifestly fell badly into one or the other frozen 
categories of terrorism and organized crime. Since then, the literature has acknowledged 
that lines of demarcation between political and criminal organization are scrambled. As 
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pointed out by Tamara Makarenko (2004), a continuum has supplanted the categories and 
walls of the past: at one end of the spectrum, there are pure political entities; to the other, 
pure criminal entities exist; between the two, there is a “gray area,” including a 
kaleidoscope of hybrid actors, with situations where organized crime and terrorism are 
indistinguishable. From a certain stage, it is a question of “common cause 
convergence”.47 
These interactions between organized crime and ideological groups can be 
manifested through cooperation and alliances, the involvement of ideological groups in 
criminal activities or, conversely, the involvement of ideological groups in political 
activities. Makarenko, for example, bases her argument on a “black hole syndrome” or 
thriving political crime and commercial terrorism.48 
The concept of continuum suggests that a change in the motivations of political 
groups will occur over the long term because of their increasing immersion in criminal 
activities. As this immersion takes place, the political entity changes little in nature: The 
means becomes ends. Building on Tamara Makarenko’s work, Louise I. Shelly and John 
T. Picarelli’s the terror-crime interaction spectrum in 2005; They consider five dynamics 
of interactions.49 
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Terrorist groups and criminal groups can adopt each others’methods, imitatively, 
without working together (activity appropriation). Thus, terrorist group engages in 
criminal activities such as trafficking of illegal narcotics, cigarettes, and human beings, 
while criminal organizations commits acts of terrorism. These groups do not cooperate 
but borrow the typical activity of the other.50 
The next step is that of contact or nexus in the form of the exchange of goods, 
expertise or services between terrorist and criminal groups including false documents and 
transportation. A third step is taken when the groups deepen their cooperation by creating 
procedures or structures for business relations leading to a symbiosis (symbiotic 
relationship). Thus, the relations are maintained, for example, by the UCK with the 
Albanian mafia or FARC with drug cartels.51 Another example is the increasing relations 
between Islamist extremist terrorist organizations, especially ISIS, with criminal 
organizations that facilitate terrorist activities in exchange for large sums of money. 
These ties had grown stronger because criminal organizations became a broker for 
terrorists in setting up black markets to sell petroleum wealth that ISIS has looted and has 
smuggled from Syria and Iraq through Turkey.52 
The fourth stage emerges when the criminal group begins to share the ideological 
objectives of the terrorists: a hybrid or dark network. This organization pursues both 
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political and criminal goals. Finally, the last step is that of transformation, when a 
terrorist group is so involved in predatory economic activities that it becomes a criminal 
activity.53 The organization, then, focuses as much on traditional criminal activities as on 
terrorism. For example, Salafist ideology is not so much a goal as a mean: it is a mask of 
predatory motivations (violence, money, power). Consequently, dangerous entities can no 
longer fall into single categories, either political or criminal. A phenomenon of mixing 
and crossing occurred between the bandit and the political (weapon). This is the 
definition of hybridization.54 
Starting from the analyzes of Shelley and Picarelli considered above, this thesis 
develops and applies a model built around four figures of hybridization. The first three 
are dynamic and historical and will thus be distinguished through processes of 
cooperation, convergence and mutation. The fourth figure is topographic: territorial 
coexistence. 
The first stage of hybridization is embryonic. It is a question of the existence of 
long- term means of cooperation (links, contacts, exchanges, alliances) that criminal and 
political groups, still separate and distinct, develop according to opportunistic and 
utilitarian logics. In this still narrow perspective, it is important to note the work of John 
Rollins, Liana Sun Wiler and Seth Rosen (2010), who identify and explain the incentives 
that allow for the development and maintenance of such relationships. Violent actors are 
also rational actors. They know how to adopt strategies, both individually and 
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collectively, perform cost/benefit calculations, maximize their gains (materials, symbolic, 
policies) and minimize their losses.55 For example, Medellin cartel asked the guerrillas of 
the Eln to make carriages traps when failing to dispose of this knowledge.56 In the 1980s, 
Camorra collaborated with Red Brigades in kidnapping and assassination operations.57 
The second level of hybridization is that of convergence. The political and 
criminal entities tend to resemble each other. Their structure and methods are mirrored by 
imitation. Terrorism borrows the methods of criminals and vice versa. Louise Shelly, et 
al. (2005) note that as a matter of practice, specialists consider that only structures and 
methods converge, not objectives: “Methods, not Motives”, to summarize.58 
The third level is that of a convergence pushed at the end of its logic and leading 
to the fusion of political and criminal entities, in other words to a mutation 
(transformation) pure and simple. Groups become indistinctly both political (terrorist 
guerrilla) and criminal. Terrorist entities and criminal entities share the same methods but 
also the same purpose or motives.59 Then, the violent scene involves criminal groups with 
 
55. John, Rollins, Liana, Wiler & Seth Rosen, “International Terrorism and 
Transnational Crime: Security Threats, U.S. Policy, and Considerations for Congress” 
Congressional Research Service 2010, accessed September 22, 2018, 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41004-2010.pdf. 
56. “Profiles: Colombia’s Armed Groups,” BBC 2013, accessed January 17, 2019, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-11400950. 
57. “Europe’s Crime-Terror Nexus:  Links Between Terrorist And Organized 
Crime Groups In The European Union,” European Parliament 2012, 23, accessed 
January 17, 2019, accessed via http://www.europarl.europa.eu. 
58. Louise, Shelly et al, “Methods and Motives: Exploring Links Between 
Transnational Organized Crime & International Terrorism,” OCCRP 2005, 
https://www.occrp.org/REPORTS/OC%20and%20Terrorism.pdf. 
59. Erik, Elda, “Links Between Terrorism, Organized Crime and Crime: The Case 
of the Sahel Region,” International Journal of Security and Development 3, no. 1 (2014), 
accessed September 22, 2018, https://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.ea/. 
 27 
 
political aims and terrorist groups with criminal aims. In fact, they are multi-faceted and 
multi-purpose groups, kinds of conglomerates of causes.  
The idea that a human organism can fulfill at the same time two objectives, one 
political (terrorist) the other economic (criminal predator), shocks a number of analysts. 
However, complex organisms, including states, are already pursuing multiplied and often 
contradictory goals. In such situations, seemingly political or criminal groups recruit the 
same individuals who have the potential to be “terrorist in the day, criminals at night”.60 
Thus, Justine A Rosenthal (2008) describes the emergence of a terrorism sui 
generis. She notes that terrorism-for-profit by kidnapping individuals and holding them 
for ransom or producing and distributing illegal narcotics is a classic criminal activity, 
one that is legitimized by a varnish or an ideological facade. These new terrorists have a 
“malleable” ideology that allows them to work with anyone.61 Afghanistan, Iraq or Africa 
since the 1990s, are the privileged theaters of evolution for these new hybrid politically 
and economically motivated armed entrepreneurs.  
In the end, Tamara Makarenko contends: “most criminal and terrorist groups 
operational in the 1990s and into the twenty-first century have developed the capacity to 
engage in both criminal and terrorist activities.”62 Furthermore, Shelley and Picarelli 
consider that this phenomenon of ultimate symbiosis between terrorism and organized 
crime is observed particularly in “regions of the world where combinations of poor 
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governance, ethnic separatism and/or a tradition of criminal activity that are most likely 
to support crime-terror interactions- such as failed states, war regions, penal institutions 
and some neighborhoods of urban centers”.63 
According to Boaz Ganor (2012), who bases his point of view primarily on the 
long-term observation of Lebanese Hezbollah, a hybrid terrorist organization acts 
simultaneously on two levels. The first concerns are pseudo-legitimate and voluntary 
activities: benefits related to charity, social protection, education and religion but also 
political activities at the municipal and national levels. The second concerns are 
illegitimate and illegal activities related to political violence and terrorism involving the 
demand for and the conduct of attacks.64 For example, in Egypt, if the Muslim 
Brotherhood is never directly involved in targeted terrorist acts and assassinations, such 
as the one that killed President Sadat in 1981, they still pull the strings, favoring oriented 
action towards indoctrination and phagocyting of the society that they take as a hostage, 
leaving armed action to their radicalized followers who obviously lose control, as was in 
the case in Algeria with the Islamic Salvation Front and the armed groups born of its 
ideological matrix.65  
The United States has made the phenomenon of the hybridization of criminal 
species an important element of their reflection, as evidenced by the document setting the 
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national security strategy published in July 2011 during the first term of President Barack 
H. Obama, US strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, which is pointedly 
subtitled Addressing Converging Threats to National Security. This study notes that the 
processes of hybridization are facilitated by the existence of half-world intermediaries 
and facilitators (bankers, law firms, communicators, and real estate agents), which, at the 
same time, help the political and criminal entities to whiten their activities (money and 
image), and consequently, contribute to bring them closer together.66 
According to Jorge Heine and Ramesh Thakur (2011), the growth of organized 
crime does not simply represent globalization in a classical way. It is, in fact, one of the 
most active drivers. High crime has come out of its reserve and its traditional, 
geographical, and psychological limits: it has discovered many horizons of profit, 
corruption and alliance.67  
On the other hand, political entities are criminalizing. In 2012, the United States 
Department of State described more than 20 foreign terrorist organizations as having 
benefited from criminal financing,68 including, most notably, Somalian Al Shebab, 
Colombia National Liberation Army (ELN), Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC), Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM), Hezbollah, Haqqani Network, 
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and Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), even if such lists do not escape the subjectivity, 
because of the qualifier of “terrorist” and the diplomatic contingencies. 
During the Northern Ireland conflict (1968-1998), loyalist and Catholic Protestant 
paramilitary groups had access to funding from common law crime, with racketeering, 
armed robbery, drug trafficking, counterfeiting, and user loans the principal methods 
employed.69 In the Philippines, the armed struggle experienced an identical criminal drift. 
In 1990, the meeting between a young Islamist militant Abdurajack Janjalani and 
Mohammed Al-Khalifa, Al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden’s brother-in-law, gave birth 
to Islamist extremist terrorist the group called Abu Sayyaf on the southern island of 
Mindano. That group then began to, carry out attacks against the Christian churches and 
targeted assassinations. The group practiced kidnapping for ransom. After Janjalani’s 
death of his leader in 1998, “Abu Sayyaf” turned to recruiting members from 
criminalized armed gangs, rather than retaining radical Islam as a useful faҫade.70 
Michael E. Carter explains: “Abu Sayyaf is also expanding operations to include global 
jihad, aligning themselves with bin Laden’s zeal in attacking infidels throughout the 
world.”71 
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The investment of a political entity in large-scale criminal activities never exists 
without tactical and strategic consequences. Having increased income radically changes 
the equation of relations with the state and society. As Chris Dishman (2001) points out, 
terrorist groups or guerrillas, believing that their causes had become “futile,” decided to 
turn themselves into criminal organizers while retaining a convenient “political 
banner.”72 
From 1989 on, the criminologist Rachel Ehrenfeld describes in her report Narco-
Terrorism: The Kremlin Connection as the growing links between terrorists and drug 
traffickers who thus cooperate or unite.73 In Central Asia, for example, Afghanistan 
deserves careful consideration. Even though the country has always had heroin 
production, it did not really take off until after the Soviet defeat in 1989 and the end of 
funding by the foreign states of the Islamist mujahedeen rebels. Afghanistan has quickly 
become a narcoeconomy and the world’s largest producer of opium whose commerce 
provides three quarters of the GDP of the country. Opium is no longer just a source of 
funding for armed groups, but the main issue of contention in the 1990s intra-state 
conflict between Afghan warlords such as Rachid Dostom and Gullbuddin Hekmatayar.  
Since then, all armed groups and some Afghan government officials are in one 
way or another influenced by the revenues of opium production and distribution. The 
Taliban behave like other narco traffickers and since the decade of 2000 are not just 
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taxing producers and traffickers: they protect or even own laboratories. Starting from a 
study of the 34 provinces of Afghanistan between 1994 and 2008, James A Piazza (2012) 
showed that there was a causal link between the level of opium production and the 
likelihood of terrorist attacks.74 In other words, opium is not a single mode of operation 
but a goal of war in itself, explaining the place and frequency of attacks. James A. Piazza 
points out that while drug trafficking has proliferated in Afghanistan due to the instability 
occasioned by the Soviet invasion of 1979, the same traffic is also a sustaining force for 
terrorism.75 Terrorism has not led to the emergence of opium trafficking. Opium 
trafficking, on the other hand, explains the development of terrorism. Opium is a cause 
not an effect of terrorism. 
Terrorism And Organized Crime-Similarities And Differences 
In many respects, terrorism is just like organized crime. For example, many ways 
to protect oneself from terrorism also serves as effective safeguards against organized 
crime. And yet, in many cases, this is tantamount to confusing a tennis ball and an 
automobile on the pretext that you can stop both with a brick wall. This is a first source 
of confusion, based on police means. One second, based on the damage, could be stated 
as follows: it is obvious that those who die at the hands of terrorists or organized 
criminals are no more or less dead, their relatives are not more or less saddened by 
identity or the motives of their attacker. 
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These forms of confusion, omnipresent in the media, are also very often found in 
scholarly literature. Recently, the mode of network analysis has also shown the existence 
of similarities in the organization of criminal groups and terrorist groups.76 The 
difficulties of defining terrorism are well known, but the concept of organized crime is 
not much better.77 If we want to avoid the tautologies and pitfalls that arise when we want 
to make a solid distinction between the level of “organization” of a group of young 
grafters and that of Cosa Nostra, we must use a more sociological definition, as used by 
Kostiukovsky (2003): “a coherent set of social interactions created by a desire for illicit 
profit”78. As for terrorism, the definitions are legion (Schmid and Jongman, 1988, have 
made a magisterial census)79, but for the purposes of this research, terrorism is simplified 
by describing it as the application of coercive violence to achieve one or more political 
objective(s). Therefore, the difference seems to be the motives: on the one hand profit 
and on the other hand a range of infinite political rationalities. 
Two details still need to be brought. The first is that in both cases, it is the actual 
activities that underlie the identification and not the identity of the individuals or groups 
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that matter most. Groups or individuals are only terrorists to the extent that their activities 
can be characterized in that fashion.80 Similarly, it would be pointless to identify a group 
as an organized criminal group without any of its members engaging in organized 
criminal activity.81 This may seem obvious but has consequences. For example, several 
groups considered “terrorist” are in fact guerrilla groups that occasionally engage in 
terrorist activities (there is no implication here that it is morally preferable to be a 
guerrilla terrorist or mafioso)82. In fact, Red Army Faction leaders “repeatedly cite 
Brazilian guerilla and public theorist Carlos Marighella, who advocated a strategy of 
provocation.”83 
The major difference between these groups and those more clearly focused on 
terrorism is the control of a territory, which makes the typical guerrilla group a quasi-
state organization, applying some generalized social control, no doubt collecting 
“revolutionary taxes”, carrying out large-scale financial operations, often equipped with a 
more or less developed bureaucracy, and engaged in an open military conflict with the 
official authorities. Mancur Olson (1993) notes: “a stationary bandit has an encompassing 
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interest in the territory he controls and accordingly provides domestic order and other 
public goods.”84 The second clarification deals with terrorist support activities: helping 
people by hiding them, by crossing borders, and so on; recruiting new members; training, 
educating these members, financing the activities of the group, and acquiring the 
necessary equipment (whose possession is often illegal or controlled).85 
The first aspect of similarities between terrorist groups and criminal groups is the 
tactics both employ. Violence is an intrinsic part of both spheres of activity and its tools 
tend to converge towards firearms and explosive products. A part from violence, note that 
several tools are used by all.86  
A second type of similarity is centered around the question of financing, as all 
organizations must raise some money to be able to function. It should be noted, however, 
that the needs of terrorism are very low. For example, the worst case of terrorist attack in 
Canada, the bombing of Air India Flight 182 and the device that exploded prematurely at 
Narita Airport in Tokyo, was done with a few hundred dollars, including the price airline 
tickets; Madrid in March 2004 and London in July 2005 were even cheaper. 
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In fact, the Air India Flight 182, which was to connect Montreal to New Delhi on 
June 23, 1985, remains the deadliest air attack after September 11, 2001 in New York. 
An hour earlier, a bomb intended to be embarked on another plane of the Indian company 
had exploded at Tokyo’s Narita airport, killing two handlers. The majority of the 1985 
victims were Canadian nationals. Investigators believe the two operations were planned 
in British Columbia, home to half of Canada’s 200,000-plus Sikhs, in an attempt to 
avenge a murderous raid on the Amritsar Golden Temple by the Indian Army, the cradle 
of Sikh faith, in 1984.87 
While in Madrid in 2004, thirteen bombs were placed in suburban trains, ten of 
which exploded in four on the morning of Thursday of March 11th, seven minutes apart; 
191 people died in the attacks, where nearly two thousand people were killed. A year 
later in London, on July 7, 2005, the city’s transportations were hit by four suicide 
attacks, killing fifty-six people (including four perpetrators) and injuring hundreds of 
others.88 
Nevertheless, the authorities of most countries in the world, especially under 
pressure from the United States, seem to have decided to fight against terrorism by going 
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through the track of financial transactions.89 For example, the Anti-Terrorism Act (C-36) 
of December 2001 amended the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Act, now called 
the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act, which deals 
with two types of organization without distinction.90 Yet, notwithstanding all the ink that 
has flowed about Usama Ben Laden’s grossly over-valued fortune, terrorism is an 
activity that does not require any major financial transaction. 
A third similarity lies in the transnational character of criminal and terrorist 
activities. This is mainly due to pleonasm, since it is of course expected that international 
terrorism involves several states; In fact, “transnationality” is no more a fundamental 
characteristic of terrorism than of organized crime.91 That said, many typical activities of 
both criminal groups and terrorist groups cross national borders for three types of 
reasons. The first is simply that some products, weapons or other materials are not 
available or more difficult to obtain in some countries. The second is that the change (or 
even better, several successive changes) of state jurisdiction can help to conceal the 
activities, people, funds and transactions. In this respect, it should be noted that there is a 
significant difference in the reasons for concealing funds and financial transactions; for 
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organized crime, money laundering is the removal of the criminal source of funds so that 
it can be used on the legal market.92 
For the terrorist group, the source of funds does not matter; it is often legal 
(charities, collections, donations), but even if it is not the case as the transfer is already 
illegal because of its destination, laundering is useless.93 Thus, it is a “blackening” of the 
money that must be spoken of, which consists in eliminating not its origin, but its 
possible use; this, while keeping in mind that the sums needed for terrorism are derisory. 
A final reason for internationalization is that occasionally members of local groups 
emigrate, for multiple reasons, and reproduce in their host country the conflict that 
existed in the one they left.94 For example, in view of the profiles of the terrorists that 
have struck France in recent years, it appears that a recurring criterion would be an origin 
in North Africa, and more specifically in former colonies or French protectorate. In 
England, where Muslim immigration is mainly from India and Pakistan, they are people 
from these countries who take action. People who build these networks or manipulate 
them act in an opportunistic way. They know very well that these young people, in social 
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and material difficulty and who are easily manipulated, are available for them. They 
make human bombs or others.95 
The fourth and final point of comparison between terrorism and organized crime 
is their perceived seriousness and their media treatment, two elements that are, of course, 
closely linked. In both cases, the media dwell on the spectacular sides of events and offer 
a simplistic and sensationalist treatment. This kind of approach is necessarily linked to 
the visibility. The destruction of places, buildings, or human bodies must be visible to 
take its place.96 The bombing of Flight 182, which occurred over the Atlantic, left few 
obvious traces and thus scarcely marked the Canadian collective imagination, unlike 
9/11, which enjoyed unprecedented visibility.  
The most important contrast, many of which follow, is the intention of the actors. 
Simply put, with some exceptions, the ultimate goal of the terrorist is political whereas 
that of the member of a criminal organization is economic.97 This difference is not just a 
matter of content; Let us first note that if the political ends can be satisfied in principle, 
and therefore that their realization would mark an end point, the end which constitutes to 
enrich oneself can never be definitively realized and continues to impose oneself 
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infinitely. In fact, the purpose of such an organization is to continue to exist, while the 
terrorist group aims to become useless as quickly as possible. 
Needless to say, in many cases, the political goal of various terrorist groups is 
politically unfeasible, even unrealistic, or absurd to us as observers. It is also likely that 
even the terrorists themselves have little hope of triumphing and continue routinely, 
because they can no longer imagine any other career or because they feel that despite of 
their low chances of success, continuing to try is a religious or moral imperative.98 
Nevertheless, overall most terrorist speeches refer to a finality in time, and as close as 
possible. This has a number of unparalleled consequences for organized crime. Firstly, 
the perception by the members of a lack of progress or insufficiency of the effects of the 
actions undertaken can lead to an escalation or intensification of tactics. In a criminal 
group, criminal activities are evaluated according to their own ability to produce a 
satisfactory income, and not to an idealized standard future.99 If a racket ceases to be 
profitable enough. For example, if the taxes levied on a product for which a black market 
has been developed are suddenly reduced, or if a defended good is suddenly legalized, it 
will be replaced by another. 
Finally, the existence of the terrorist group is subject to the socio-political 
evolution of its environment. Political and legal changes can undermine the legitimacy or 
appearance of necessity or urgency of a political objective. Even if group members do not 
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feel or reject this change, the intensity of support they find, in the general public, can be 
greatly diminished or even destroyed. This implies that terrorist activity can be tackled by 
political change and negotiation, since one of the ways to reduce it is to make political 
demands, that justify it, obsolete.100 By contrast, the pursuit of profit cannot be rendered 
obsolete (unless we abandon capitalism, of course, note that this tends to be a demand 
from terrorist groups, not criminal groups). 
The second contrast has to do with the use of violence as a tactic. Obviously, the 
terrorist occasionally uses violence to make some social control, just like criminal 
groups.101 What defines terrorism, however, is the systematic use of violence directly 
applied to political change. In this regard, the difference can be summarized as follows: 
terrorists use violence as much as possible, while criminal groups use it as little as 
possible. The terrorist uses the maximum violence that he believes he can justify to his 
audience; if this audience is absolutist and bellicose, the limit disappears for all practical 
purposes.102 On the contrary, a criminal organization that uses too much violence risks 
maximizing the police pitfalls that are detrimental to corporate profitability. It should also 
be added that the violence of criminal organizations is almost exclusively reserved for the 
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organization’s competitors and delinquent members, while the terrorists aim much more 
broadly.103 
Thirdly, the moralizing position of terrorist speech is often a sticking point with 
criminal groups. In almost all cases, terrorist utopia is free of all crime, and especially of 
organized crime.104 For a terrorist group, accepting crime is tantamount to losing some of 
its legitimacy to the public. The Provisional Irish Republican Army’s (PIRA) speech 
about the kneecap (shot in the knees) of the Belfast dealers is particularly telling. Also 
practiced by Ulster Defense Association (UDA), IRA’s Unionist rival, kneecapping is a 
means of maintaining order in the absence of effective state power.105  
The two types of organizations are also differentiated by the nature of their 
relationship with the state. Excluding instances of vigilance, terrorist groups 
fundamentally oppose two major types of targets: governments and private companies.106 
This opposition should not be seen as a form of parasitic economic predation, which is 
characteristic of organized crime groups. The terrorist group, by its action, seeks to 
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destroy the capacity of the State to govern, to demonstrate its incompetence or 
powerlessness, to punish the State (as an active entity) or the citizens to force the 
administration to adopt or abandon certain policies or laws, or even to simply replace the 
administration in an open revolution of the Marxist or Maoist or fascist type.107 
In near contrast, the environment that maximizes the effectiveness of criminal 
organizations is a stable political administration, a consistent and predictable legal 
system, and a state that can effectively maintain basic services, especially critical 
infrastructure for conducting business (legal or otherwise) and generalized social 
peace.108 The other case in point, of which the Sicilian mafia is the perfect illustration, is 
the installation of an organization in the absence of a functional state, as in Sicily in the 
middle of the 19th century.109 In both cases, the criminal organization always aims to 
minimize its contacts with the authorities, while the latter are targets for terrorist 
activities. 
Like any criminological categorization, the one that separates organized crime 
from terrorism remains porous, with several shifts evident. These shifts occasionally 
come from the actors themselves, but much of it comes from speeches and political and 
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police activities.110 In the first place, it is possible that a group loses its dominant terrorist 
to engage more and more in more traditionally criminal activities. Several guerrilla 
groups follow this path more or less. There are, of course, several reasons which explain 
these shifts towards the more and more systematic amalgamation of different activities, 
which has several political uses. First, assimilating insurgent (or simply protesting) 
groups to criminal organizations is a powerful public delegitimation discourse, aimed at 
reducing the support enjoyed by seditious movements among the population.111 On the 
contrary, it may also be useful to equate criminal groups with terrorism when justifying 
military intervention abroad, as is the case for the South American drug cartels, against 
which enormous military resources are deployed, with the help of the United States.112 
Contribution to Existing Literature 
This thesis will explain that the politicization of criminal entities comes from the 
quantitative and qualitative development of their economic and financial activities. These 
economic and financial entrepreneurs find themselves depositories of a political and 
social power indexed on their enrichment, to the now macroeconomic point of view. The 
thesis will also explain that as criminal and financial flows spread through the economy 
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and finance through laundering, these criminal entities acquire positions of power within 
the society. Today, high organized criminality has the ability to do, but primarily to 
influence the conduct of other units, that of individuals but also large companies and 
states. 
To sum up, this thesis builds on the above-mentioned body of the literature by 
suggesting that there is a strong relationship between organized crime and terrorism. For 
example, terrorists rely on drugs as a source of financing and smugglers use them to 
smuggle and promote drug traffickers. The perpetrators of the illicit drug trafficking are 
among the most dangerous organized terrorist criminals. They do not believe in any 
religion and their only goal is to destroy energies and make money. 
Criminal organizations working in the field of drug production and trafficking 
have benefited to the fullest extent the progress of the science of technology and 
management of science. This has become clear from the precise organization, 
management and covert cooperation between cocaine and heroin trafficking 
organizations in many countries. They share many characteristics that enable them to 
reach their ends. 
This chapter builds upon the works of Tamara Makarenko, Louise I. Shelly and 
John T. Picarelli by distinguishing three stages of hybridization. First, cooperation: 
Terrorist and criminal organizations can build alliances to obtain funding or weapons. 
Then, the convergence: these organizations begin to resemble each other and to act by 
mimicry. Finally, the mutation: groups become indistinctly both political and criminal. 
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These processes of rapprochement and transformation transcend ideologies. The chapter 
demonstrates this by proposing a world tour of hybrid groups.  
The next chapter of the methodology defines the case study as it pertains to the 
existing body of the literature. It explains how the case studies of Western Europe and 
North/West Africa be implemented to clarify the relationship between terrorists and 
criminal organizations. This is accomplished by exploring both of these regions and 
applying a comparative perspective. 
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CHAPTER III– METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
In 2004, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan and the Panel of High-
Level Persons proposed a definition of terrorism as “any action ... intended to cause death 
or serious bodily harm to civilians or civilians non-combatants, when the purpose of such 
an act is to force a government or an international organization to take any action or to 
refrain from doing so.”113 But there is a lack of consensus on this definition. This thesis 
will present and assess the extent of the significance of the hypothesis that Islamist 
extremist terrorist strategy and tactics are not only driven by religious ideology, but also 
by classic gangster practices. It will demonstrate that in the 21st century, the figure of the 
terrorist fighter, the irregular, is no longer be a pure political actor, like during the Cold 
War, but a mix of a gangster and a politicized individual. 
International terrorism certainly need not be sponsored by a given state. The most 
disturbing sociological characteristic of this brand of terrorism in the 21st century is that 
nine-tenths of the individuals who have committed attacks in the name of Salafist 
Islamist extremism, in Western European countries such as France and Belgium and also 
in the countries of the Sahel of North and West Africa such as Algeria and Niger, have 
lengthy criminal records preceding their radicalization.114 It is a totally new phenomenon. 
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Past borders have faded. This thesis will make readers rethink the fight against terrorism 
and organized crime, two dangers that have grown more connected over the past three 
decades. Today, “mixing phenomena” are taking place. Gangs, cartels and mafias have 
often merged, whereas during the Cold War they were separate. Thus, in terrorism or 
organized crime, there are “multidimensional” people. 
This thesis uses a comparative case study approach to identify and explain the 
principal similarities and distinction between terrorism and organized crime in Western 
Europe and the Sahel region of North/West Africa, respectively. By analyzing the 
perpetrators of terrorist attacks carried out by formal members and/or supporters of 
Islamist extremist organizations in France, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and Spain and 
also the Sahel from 1990-2018, the thesis notes that many of these perpetrators have 
started in petty crime or serious crime. They were originally “classic predators,” which 
was not prevalent in previous waves of terrorism in those regions. These criminals went 
to seek a justification more or less conscious in Salafist Islam. The study will also 
describe the “hybridity” of violence as a “central figure” of globalization, its “black 
face”. Narco-terrorism appears in this thesis as the first marker of this evolution. 
Qualitative Comparative Case Study Analysis 
Despite the recognition of the methodological contribution of the case study in the 
in-depth examination of a phenomenon, the fact remains that it relies on a relatively 
limited number of cases, raising the question of the scientific rigor and validation of the 
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results produced by this type of research.115 However, for some, case studies are 
considered as a preparatory phase for real scientific research used to mark the ground and 
to make assumptions emerge.  
The case study is already widely recognized by the political science community 
for its contribution to exploratory research and the understanding of hard-to-measure 
factors, as well as its synergistic action with other research strategies116. Yet, despite the 
review of different sources of information and the use of several methodological 
processes, case studies face some criticisms. The most frequent are, among other things, 
the unconsciousness of the bias of the results, the erroneous choice of the case, the lack of 
depth in the study of the case, the lack of verification of validity and fidelity as well as a 
false interpretation or generalization of results.117Furthermore, qualitative case studies are 
far more useful in explaining the effects of independent variables on dependent variables 
than quantitative methods that simply measure those effects.118 
Several schools of qualitative analytical thought assess the utility methodology of 
case studies. First, Yin (1994) proposes a more positivistic view of testing and 
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corroborating a hypothesis.119 Stake (1995) puts more emphasis on the case study120. In 
addition, both Yin (1994) and Stake (1995) note the utility of contributed to the 
recognition of case studies in explaining the complex links of a contemporary 
phenomenon in its real-life context. So far, as the observation of the interactions of a 
large number of factors is aimed at inducing a theoretical model, the cases are of 
secondary interest; that is, they import less than the situations that provide them. In fact, 
the case study provides an observation site.121 The case study is “a method involving 
systematically gathering enough information about a particular person, social setting, 
event or group to permit the researcher to effectively understand how the subject operates 
or functions.”122  
Further, Yin (1994) and Stake (1995) propose a deductive analytical approach in 
the sense that they mark the boundaries of the case and ensure the reproducibility of the 
results of the research. By contrast, Starman (2013) proposes an inductive approach with 
the emergence of theoretical propositions. According to this author, the case study helps 
to discover and interpret rather than validate a hypothesis. In this sense, the inductive 
approach of the case study succeeds in explaining certain phenomena not addressed 
effectively by existing theories.123 The knowledge and theories from previous research 
 
119. R, Yin, Case Study Research: Design And Methods (London: Sage 1994), 
17. 
120. R, Stake, The Art of Case Study Research (London: Sage 1995), 3.  
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help in the precision of the object of research and the selection of relevant units. The case 
study is, then, defined as a comprehensive and intensive description of a single case, 
phenomenon or social unit.124 Moreover, the case study is, also understood as an 
integrated and delimited system, makes it possible to reveal the phenomenon.125 
Therefore, the knowledge produced is concrete, contextual, subject to interpretation and 
in reference to the reader’s population.126 
Since human behavior is never static, the reliability and generalizability of any 
case study remains problematic. Merriam Sharan and Robin Grenier (2019) argue that 
reliability is impossible, at least in the traditional sense of the word. In addition, the 
information depends on who provides it, the level of skill of the researcher and the design 
of the case study that seems to exclude the controls. They also argue that even though the 
replication of a qualitative study will not yield the same results, this fact does not 
discredit the results of the original research. Several interpretations of the same data can 
be made and held, as long as they are not contradicted by new evidence.127  
 In terms of internal validity, the lack of representativeness of the case, the use of 
too much freedom on the part of the researcher and the collection of unsystematic data 
may introduce bias in the results. However, according to Roy (2009), by placing the 
phenomenon in its real context, the case study tends to limit the risk of measurement 
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error of the data collection tools and allows the identification of unexpected factors.128 
Merriam Sharan (1998) argues that the observation of people’s construction of reality 
constitutes the strength of the internal validity of qualitative research. From this 
perspective, the importance is placed on the understanding of the points of interest for the 
actors, the discovery of the complexity of the human behavior in context and the 
presentation of a holistic interpretation of the events.129 
Therefore, the uniqueness of the cases simply does not allow one to draw global 
conclusions. Sharan and Tisdell (2016) point out that individual cases are precisely 
chosen in order to understand in depth “the particular” and not to find what is generally 
true for many.130 In sum, the methodology of the case study is driven by a desire to 
understand the functioning of a phenomenon through a dive into its constituent 
elements.131 The resolution of this methodological paradox lies in the fact that the case 
study inhabits a space of research in which contextualization and complexity are the 
foundations of a unique mode of contribution to knowledge in a given field.132 
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Reiteration and Explanation of Central Argument 
This thesis presents and assesses the extent of the validity of the following 
hypothesis/central argument: As Islamist extremist terrorist groups’ financial needs 
increase, they are more likely to use collaboration with organized criminal enterprises, 
relative to other sources, as their principal means of funding. The thesis compares, the 
case studies of North/West Africa on one hand and Western Europe on the other by 
exposing cigarette trafficking in North Africa toward Europe as a means for terrorists to 
generate funds to pursue their activities. Some of the cigarettes sold in France are 
illegally sold. One third of this illegal market comes from North Africa. Cigarettes sold in 
contraband are transported by small packets, by mules a little everywhere in North 
Africa, they are thus very difficult to detect and thus to stop.133 If one focuses on North 
Africa, in particular, one of the biggest explanations is corruption, complicity. The 
problem is that transnational criminal and terrorist organizations work with government 
officials.  
On the other hand, in Western Europe, terrorist groups finance their activities 
either through cash financing or by buying weapons from warlords, black markets or 
arms manufacturers under international cover.134 Furthermore, the thesis shows that in 
Western Europe, extortion, kidnapping, drug trafficking, smuggling, fraud, theft, use of 
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diamonds, are considered the main sources of illegal funding for terrorist 
organizations.135 
In the case study of Western Europe, the countries to be examined, are France, 
Belgium, the United Kingdom, and Spain. These countries were chosen, in the study, 
because they were the ones that were particularly targeted by ISIS.136 For the case study 
of North/West Africa, the countries, in question, are: Nigeria, Mali, Niger, and Algeria. 
These countries have been chosen in the study because jihadists movements, such as Al-
Qaeda, have been more active in this region.137  
The Western Europe and North/Africa case studies will be assessed by gathering 
and presenting data in the following manner: 
In terms of the methodological approach, each case study will be examined in the 
same fashion, with examination of the motivations and tactics of the criminal and terrorist 
organizations in each country under consideration presented structurally in the same 
fashion for each case. For each of those countries, the motivations, objectives and tactics 
employed by each of the criminal and terrorist organizations under consideration will be 
presented in turn. The categories of motivations objective and tactics will be divided into 
categories focusing on economic, ethnic, ideological, military, political and religious 
issue areas. 
 
135. Yvon, Dandurand & Vivienne, Chin, “Links Between Terrorism And Other 
Forms Of Crime,” accessed March 20, 2019, https://icclr.law.ubc.ca/wp-
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For the case study of Western Europe, the sources of data include Anne Barker’s 
Salah Abdeslam: The Former Bar Manager Now On The Run As One of The World’s 
Most Wanted Terrorists, Magnus Normark and Magnus Ranstorp’s Understanding 
Terrorist Finance: Modus Operandi And National CTF Regimes, Emilie Oftedal’s The 
Financing of Jihadi Terrorist Cells in Europe, and Pieter Ostaeyen’s Belgian Radical 
Networks and The Road to the Brussels Attacks.  
For the case study of North/West Africa, the sources of data include Abdelkader, 
Abderrahmane’s The Sahel: A Crossroads between Criminality and Terrorism, James, 
Stavridis’s How Terrorists Can Exploit Globalization, Zachary Laub & Jonathan 
Masters’s Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and Lauren Vriens’s Armed Islamic Group 
(Algeria, Islamists). 
To sum up, the thesis will focus on events that happened both in Western Europe 
and the Sahel region of North/West Africa to show that both of these regions share in 
common the most dangerous pictures of organized crime to include terrorism, smuggling 
of people, and also drug trafficking. The thesis will implement an explanatory method to 
spot a light on the growing phenomenon of religiosity among young people in the 
suburbs of France, for example, which has been a concern for successive French 
governments since the start of the 1980s. 
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CHAPTER IV– PRESENTATION OF CASE STUDIES -WESTERN 
EUROPE/SAHEL OF NORTH/WEST AFRICA 
Introduction 
In terms of the methodological approach, both of the case studies of Western 
Europe and the Sahel of North/West Africa will be examined in the same fashion, with 
examinations of the motivations and tactics of the criminal and terrorist organizations in 
each country, to include France, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and Spain for Western 
Europe and Nigeria, Mali, Niger, and Algeria for the Sahel region, under consideration 
presented structurally in the same fashion for each case. For each of those countries, the 
motivations, objectives, and tactics employed by each of the criminal and terrorist 
organizations under consideration will be presented in turn. The categories of motivations 
objective and tactics will be divided into categories focusing on economic, ideological, 
military, religious, ethnic, and political issues areas. 
Case Study on Western Europe 
The Islamist extremist organizations that have attacked targets in the Western 
world since the 1990s, France and its laic model, have been drawing most of their 
terrorists into the breeding ground of the criminal and delusional world of common 
law.138 In 2015 and 2016, France suffered the costliest series of terrorist attacks in its 
history. The toll of the victims was considerable: 238 people killed and hundreds more 
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wounded.139 Most commentaries and analyzes, whether they are journalistic, political, or 
academic in orientation, attempt to decipher these murders using the notion of 
“radicalization”. In fact, the perpetrators of the attacks in France and Belgium in 2015 
and 2016 come from the world of gangsterism.140 The vast majority of these terrorists 
were originally and essentially criminals and common delinquents, who have since 
crossed the Rubicon of politics. They are not pure political actors using illegal means for 
a cause. 
France: 
The itinerary of the brothers Brahim and Salah Abdessalam, two young Franco-
Belgians of Moroccan origin, who were among those who carried out a series of terrorist 
attacks against civilian targets in Paris of November 2015 is in this respect significant.141 
Olivier Moos explains that these two jihadists seem to have drifted, in the space of a few 
months, from an environment made of small delinquency, night club and video games, to 
a commitment to the service of the Islamic State and violence terrorist.142 This relative 
suddenness and this passage between two universes of meaning supposedly in opposition 
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are not so surprising when they are restored in the context of an individualistic culture of 
mass entertainment and delinquency, the only capital of symbolic resources accessible to 
the majority of people. These young neo-jihadists, with a culture or flourish 
theatralization and normalization of violence, were zapping on social media and pleasure 
of transgression.143 
After the attacks against Charlie Hebdo (7 January 2015) and the fusillades in 
Copenhagen (14 and 15 February 2015), the French Cherif, Said Kouachi and Amedy 
Coulibali, and the Danish Omar Abdel Hamid El Hussein were acclaimed on the jihadist 
website of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.144 All four had criminal records, been 
incarcerated or belonged to a violent criminal gang. Further, all four were born and raised 
in marginalized European Muslim communities. By putting their desire of violence to the 
seigneur of a cause, they could transform their status of losers into that of heroes. 
Allegiance to the caliph transforms delusion into Mujahid, that is to say into a political 
actor, even if this dimension remains very superficial. 
The question of the financing of terrorism is the subject of numerous reports, 
resolutions and international conventions. While the general aspects of the problem are 
widely studied, the link between the financing of crime and the financing of terrorism has 
not received the necessary attention. Two recent studies attempt to fill this gap. A report 
by Magnus Normark and Magnus Ranstorp of the Swedish Defense University looks at 
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how European terrorist fighters in Syria have financed their travel over the year of 2015: 
in addition to loans, private donations and bank and commercial fraud, minor offenses 
play a role consistently highlighted in the report.145 Another study by Emile Oftedal, of 
the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment (FFI), examines the financing of 40 
terrorist plots between 1994 and 2013: almost three-quarters were financed in part from 
original funds. The study shows that crime, drug trafficking, fraud and illicit trafficking 
in particular, played an important role in almost 40% of cases.146 Therefore, one should 
not be surprised that the financing of Islamist attacks in the West comes largely from 
common thefts, various tariffs, scams, forged falsification, etc. 
Belgium: 
The curriculum vitae of certain emblematic figures of terrorism and European 
jihadism who have joined or supported the Islamic state, illustrates a caricature the 
criminal origins of those fighting for Islam extremist terrorist organizations. Originally an 
ordinary delinquent, the Islamist Khalid Zerkani “Abu Riad”, born in 1973 in Zinata 
(Morocco), settled in Belgium in Molenbeek-Saint Jean, was sentenced in 2016 to 15 
years in prison for having organized from 2012 to 2015 the trips of largest chain of 
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European Islamist fighters (about 60) to the Syrian-Iraqi zone and two clandestine ISIS 
clique cells in Verviers and Brussels.147 
Zerkani is suspected of having recruited and sent to Syria the Belgian-Moroccan 
Abdelhamid Abaaoud, who played a central role in organizing the attacks of 13 
November 2015 in Paris and Saint Denis (130 dead).148Zerkani used Islamic extremism 
to help recruit wayward youths to the Islamic State, including that of the maritime district 
of Saint-Molenbeek as the prosecutor said during his trial. Zerkani financed the 
organization of the sectors by piloting a network of Maghreb offenders from the Brussels 
region, from whom he took 20% of the loot. He encouraged and authorized robbery and 
burglary in the name of Islam to finance the departure of the fighters, claiming that 
“stealing the infidels is allowed by Allah”, acting as a true gang leader neighborhood.149 
During his arrest, stolen goods found in his home (watches, cameras, jewels, etc.) were 
used to reward and encourage young recruits leaving for Syria to join the Islamic State, 
which earned him the nickname of “Papa Noel”. Zerkani had never worked in his life, 
living instead off the crimes committed by his disciplines authorized to steal the 
“disbelievers” in the name of the jihadist cause.150 
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One must ask how do the dynamics of Islamist extremist group recruitment and 
affiliation develop? The propaganda of the Islamic State knows how to seduce the 
gangsters by a rhetoric that can satisfy impulses and desires of unbridled enjoyment. The 
ideologies channel and recover psychic fragilities, a predator energy, useful contacts 
(such as weapons and false documents) and a criminal knowledge, while the bandits look 
for excuses and absolution to preserve in their deviant life. 
The United Kingdom: 
French-speaking gangster Salafism is not the only one to have been wiped out by 
the Islamic State. In Britain, the list of hybrids is long. Emblematic cases will be 
mentioned as examples: 
- In May 2008, Nick Raymond Reilly alias Muhammad Rasheed, a converted 
and radicalized delinquent, placed a bomb that explodes a restaurant called 
“The Giraffe” in a shopping center in the city of Exeter (South-West of 
England).151 
- In May 2013, in London (Woolwich), two young delinquent Nigerian 
Muslims, Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale, who called themselves 
Mujahid Abu Hamza and Ismail Ibn Abdullah, decapitate in the street (with 
chopper and knife) a British military, Lee Rigby.152 
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- On March 22, 2017, Khalid Masood committed a double attempt in London 
claimed by the Islamic State: He collided with a motor vehicle passerby on the 
Westminster Bridge and then fist a policeman in front of the parliament. He 
was finally shot. The balance was five dead including the assailant. Khalid 
Masood was a recidivist evildoer known for his deliberate degrading and 
possession of a knife, which resulted in two convictions and two stays in 
prison.153 
According to Daesh, these operations cost Western societies a great deal of 
money and accentuate their decline.154 It is quite likely that other actions in this direction 
are envisaged such as cyberterrorism or repeated sabotage of industrial infrastructures. 
Note that for Daesh, it is also allowed ideologically (halal, lawful) to steal the goods of 
the disbelievers.155 Undoubtedly, the salafist-jihadist strategy is mutating. The fact of no 
longer claiming operations will seriously complicate the task of the investigators. It will 
also be necessary to adapt the security measures to new emerging threats. 
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Spain: 
The state of the threat to Spain does not differ fundamentally from a number of 
other states in Europe, as it is a Western country, which participates in international 
missions regarded as an occupation of sacred lands and the fight against terrorism, 
international terrorism. To this must be added the reference to the myth of Al Andalus 
and the existence of two Spanish cities (Ceuta and Melilla), considered as occupied 
territories on African soil. 
In fact, the attacks of August 17 in Barcelona and Cambrils raised a lot of 
questions: who were these young terrorists? How radicalized were they prior to carrying 
out the attack? On the path of these young people, there are some important details about 
the similarities and differences with other young people involved in global jihad targeting 
several European countries. In the first place, their youth must be emphasized: the six 
people killed by the police and directly involved in these two actions were between 17 
and 24 years old. They were Moroccan, born in Mrirt for the Hichamy brothers and 
Naour for the Abouyaaqoub brothers.156 Finally, Saïd Aallaa and Moussa Oukabir are 
Spaniards, born in Ripoll.157 If one compares these attacks with the Madrid attack of 
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March 11, 2004, it is clear that there was more participation of Moroccans than other 
groups and that, overall, the terrorists were younger. 
What should one think of their social situations? Should one consider how that 
these young people were marginalized? In this regard, it is worth noting several 
indicators that make, on the contrary, the difference compared to other groups responsible 
for attacks on European soil. The first remarkable point is precisely the integration of 
these young people into the labor market. Younes, 22, worked and had a permanent 
contract in a metallurgical company, Comforsa, and since graduating from a higher 
education in electromechanical engineering, he was not short of work. Some of his 
neighbors indicated that he was getting the best salary on his team. It also seems that 
Mohamed Hichamy, 24, worked in this auto parts factory located in Ripoll with a salary 
of approximately 1,900 euros per month.158 Therefore, these young people were not 
young people excluded from the labor market as Nuria Perpinya, a social worker at 
Ripoll City Hall, states: “They were four pairs of brothers. Second generation. We 
thought that they now felt as though they belonged here, what with their Catalan, 
designer labels and jobs. And then all of a sudden we realize that integration is an 
emotional issue. A feeling”159 
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Another “classic” exclusion factor is spatial segregation, characteristic of these 
young people who live in neighborhoods in housing projects situated in the suburbs of 
big cities and in priority urban areas. But here too, this is not the case. Ripoll is a small 
municipality in which everyone knows each other, shares a football game, places to play, 
schools, institutes or workplaces. Contact with people born in the commune was therefore 
frequent. The mayor of Ripoll, Jordi Munell, speaks of immigration as an asset for his 
city of 10,600 inhabitants; the majority work in metallurgy or in the tourism sector. With 
immigrants constituting 10 percent of the local population, Ripoll knows practically no 
unemployment.160 
Consequently, these young people escape from the characteristic often put 
forward in the attacks of Paris or Brussels: that of young North Africans unemployed 
and/or having problems of professional insertion, excluded or marginalized because of 
their origin, living in large dormitory towns and having school courses enameled of many 
failures. The terrorists of Barcelona and Ripoll are qualified by their neighbors and their 
social educators as normal and responsible young people, especially Younes. The 
youngest of the terrorists spoke perfect Catalan and Spanish. These witnesses say they do 
not understand what happened.161 
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Another path to explore: the strong influence close to “brainwashing” from the 
imam of Ripoll, Es Satty, and that of several other people during a holiday in Morocco. 
In support of this hypothesis, friends, neighbors or parents interviewed since the attacks 
point out that, for a few months or even a year, these young people had started playing 
football less, being quieter and less frequent others, to stop talking about women, cars or 
video games, to erase all music on their mobile to listen to “anasheed” (prayers).162 
Younes went so far as to say that all these things no longer mattered, that they had 
discovered “the truth” and that others had gone astray in this Western world. Despite 
these remarks, no one could have imagined what would happen on August 17 in 
Catalonia. 
In fact, Abdelbaki Es Satty (45 years old), imam of the Annour mosque in Ripoll 
since 2015, appears as an ideologue, adept in the use of Salafism for recruitment 
purposes. Investigators have discovered data linking him to Daesh. His radicalization 
may have crystallized during his stay in prison between 2010 and 2014 (for drug 
trafficking), concomitant with that of several people involved in the attacks in Madrid on 
March 11, 2004.163 
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The Barcelona attacks revealed shortcomings in the intelligence system, in 
particular the inefficiency of the deployment of early warning mechanisms, as well as 
those existing in the detection device of individuals in the process of radicalization. The 
prevention and the fight against violent radicalization are part of the Spanish strategy 
against international jihadist terrorism established by the Spanish government after the 
attacks of 11 March 2004 in Madrid. This has been defined taking into account the 
objectives and approaches contained in the European Union's strategy in this area in 
2005.164 
Case Study on the North African/Sahel Region 
Introduction 
Africa is the center of some 64 terrorist organizations and groups that spread 
mostly from the far west coast of the continent to its far east coast. The spread of Islamist 
extremist ideas has contributed to the historical, economic and social structure and the 
security vacuum in that region. The observer, of the history of terrorism in the Sahelian 
region, finds it first born in Algeria in 1991 and then moves to Sudan to return to 
southern Algeria and deep into the Sahel, which is now one of the largest jihadist 
strongholds in Africa.165 
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In the aftermath of the Arab revolutions, especially the fall of the regime of 
Libyan leader Col. Muammar Gaddafi, the situation worsened as the groups exploited the 
heavy arms trade between the various groups to provide a continuous supply of weapons 
that enabled them to carry out large-scale terrorist operations in Mali, Nigeria and 
Burkina Faso which allowed these groups to move from one country to another easily.166 
This is evident in the report of the Center for Terrorism Studies in the United States, 
which confirmed the 25 percent rise in the number of attacks in the Sahel and North 
Africa from 2013 to 2014.167 
The report, entitled “Terrorism in North Africa and the Sahel in 2014”, shows that 
the number of terrorist attacks in the region has increased dramatically, with more than 
289 terrorist attacks in 2014, an increase of 800% compared to 2001, a year of Al 
Qaeda’s expansion of its terrorist operations in different parts of the world.168 
Furthermore, the past years have seen a significant development in the trends of 
terrorist organizations in North Africa and the Sahel. In the intellectual framework, most 
of these groups have adopted the idea of establishing the state of the caliphate.169 This is 
evident in the increasing phenomenon of allegiance to the local organizations of their 
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international counterparts, most notably the allegiance of the Boko Haram group to the 
Islamic State and the recruitment of its fighters to carry out operations for affiliates in 
Africa after many years of intellectual dependence on Al Qaeda. This reflects the fact that 
international organizations are seeking to establish a “terrorist belt” in North and West 
Africa. 
The terrorist groups in the Sahel developed very intellectually, organizationally 
and dynamically, and their development culminated in the emergence of both male and 
female suicide bombers.170Organizationally, these groups have moved from small groups 
operating under the secret system to state-like entities with political, economic, military 
and logistical structures. They rely on centralization to organize their movements so that 
they can find senior leadership, field units, the media unit, communications and sources 
of funding.171 
The capabilities of these countries have also known a frightening development. 
They have moved from operations such as kidnapping, assassination, sabotage, which 
require hidden weapons, bombs and limited means of communication to the ability to 
confront regular forces in battles with medium and heavy weapons, advanced means of 
communication and modern social media.172 
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As a result of the security situation in the Sahel countries and the inability to 
secure their borders, the region has become one of the most important theaters of human 
trafficking, drugs and arms smuggling in the world. Terrorist groups in the Sahel depend 
on several sources of funding, such as self-financing, drug trafficking, human trafficking 
and ransom.173 
The terrorist groups have exploited organized crime to provide self-financing for 
their operations. United Nations Office for Drugs and Crimes estimates that organized 
crime of these groups amounts to approximately $3,4 billion a year in ransom payments 
for the release of hostages and protection of drug and drug smuggling operations.174 And 
the use of such vast resources to fund training, establish safe havens and set up armed 
operations. Sources of funding come from major sources where the first is human 
trafficking or illegal immigration, whose annual revenue is estimated at $1 billion.175 The 
second source is drug trafficking from Latin America to Europe, where 10 per cent of 
cocaine smuggled into Europe passes through this region, generating an annual average 
of $ 328 million, of which 14 per cent goes to terrorist organizations that control 
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smuggling routes in the region.176 Then, comes the kidnapping of Western hostages and 
the demand for ransom for their release, and estimated the proceeds of hostage-taking $ 
50 million a year.177 
The smuggling of the largest drug shipment across Mauritanian territory 
highlights the African Sahel and Sahara region, which has become one of the most 
dangerous areas in the world, being a key transit point for drugs and a safe haven for 
terrorists. According to a report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in 
2014, drug gangs in Latin America have reached agreements with local partners in West 
African countries to turn the region into a major transit point for drugs destined for 
Europe.178 
In the Sahel, armed groups have proliferated since the 1980s and increased their 
nuisance capacity, often lethal. They have diversified into terrorists, insurgents, criminals 
and militias, according to variables such as their vision, their mission or the means 
implemented.179 From now on, cooperation and convergence bring together these groups. 
 
176. “The Drug Problem And Organized Crime, Illicit Financial Flows, 
Corruption And Terrorism,” UNODC 2017, accessed April 05, 2017, 
https://www.unodc.org/wdr2017/field/Booklet_5_NEXUS.pdf. 
177. Rukmini, Callimachi, “Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda Terror,” 
New York Times 2014, accessed April 05, 2019, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/world/africa/ransoming-citizens-europe-becomes-
al-qaedas-patron.html. 
178. “Not Just Transit: Drugs, the State, and Society In West Africa,” Global 
Commission Drugs 2017, 12, accessed April 05, 2019, 
http://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/02/WACD_En_Report_WEB_051114.pdf. 
179. “The Sahel: Promoting Political alongside Military Action,” CRISIS GROUP 
2018, accessed December 08, 2018, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/sahel-
promoting-political-alongside-military-action. 
 72 
 
“The most obvious example of this kind of cooperation-convergence is narco-terrorism,” 
says James Stavridis, former commander-in-chief of the Allied Forces in Europe (2009-
2013) and US Southern Command (2006-2009).180 The most troubling aspect of the 
connection seems to be the way in which the illegal drug trade undermines efforts to 
pursue the political reforms and development needed to stem the radicalization and rise 
of terrorist groups in several already fragile regions of the world. 
Nigeria: 
In addition to drug and arms trafficking, the significant smuggling of cigarettes 
across the Sahel is also very lucrative for traffickers in the region. Cigarettes from 
counterfeit factories, mainly from Nigeria, are distributed in the region, the Maghreb, the 
Middle East and Europe.181 This traffic is an important source of funding for terrorist 
groups, who, even if they are not always and necessarily directly involved in this kind of 
smuggling, enrich themselves by imposing a tax against a ‘close guard’ to smugglers. 
Furthermore, in southern Nigeria, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta 
(MEND) has multiple illicit activities: oil thefts, kidnapping and ethnic rebellion, and it 
has recently added terrorism to its repertoire.182 
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But beyond the fact that all these examples of trafficking and their perpetrators 
are in one way or another related, it is undoubtedly and especially the reasons and the 
roots behind this plague that it is urgent to question in order to remedy it. Misery, 
poverty, drought, famine, lack of food security, social injustice and lack of a vision for 
the future are all factors that encourage and incite local people to fall into this trap of easy 
money and a hypothetical better life. Traffickers take advantage of the idleness and socio-
economic vulnerability of local populations to convince them that they can improve their 
lives through illegal trafficking. Worse, these different terrorist groups and criminal 
organizations only contribute to the human suffering of local populations in the Sahel and 
North Africa while also endangering the already fragile states of the Sahel such as Mali 
or Niger.183 
Mali: 
In fact, the security situation has worsened as a result of escalating political 
instability in several West African countries. For example, this instability led to the 
military coup in Mali in March 2012 and the spread of armed violence in the north of the 
country, which has become a haven for terrorist groups. The French and Malian forces, 
gradually reinforced by quotas of the ECOWAS, face katibas of jihadists who belong to 
Algerian and West African networks not forgetting volunteers from Western Europe in 
general, and France in particular.  
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At the forefront of these armed Islamic movements, we find AQIM (Al Qaeda in 
the Islamic Maghreb) which has its origins in the civil war in Algeria, which during the 
bloody decade (1988-1998) has made 200,000 victims.184 At the time, the Islamists of the 
FIS (Islamic Salvation Front), who denounce the coup by the authorities following the 
modification of the electoral rules to block their political rise, will successively give birth 
to the AIG (Armed Islamist Groups) then SGPC (Salafist Group for Preaching and 
Combat) appeared in 1998.185  
Some of these terrorist groups are suspected of having links with similar groups, 
such as Boko Haram in Nigeria and Al Shabab in Somalia. Although hard evidence still 
needs to be provided in this regard, there are probabilities that the links between 
terrorism/drugs/crime actually prevail in Mali. Some Islamist activists levy “taxes” on 
drug traffickers in exchange for safe conduct, allowing these groups to directly benefit 
from illicit trafficking in the region (including smuggling of cigarettes and firearms, 
etc.).186  
Beyond the deadly attacks perpetrated against not only the Malian and foreign 
forces, but also the innocent populations by terrorist groups including AQIM, Ansardine, 
Mourabitoune, the Macina Liberation Front, etc., all grouped together within the 
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“Coalition of Defenders of Islam and Muslims”, the insecurity is also generated by the 
great banditry, on the whole national territory. Intercommunal conflict in some localities 
in the north and center of the country is also a new source of concern for social peace and 
public security.187 
Niger: 
The Sahel region, particularly Niger, is experiencing an unprecedented rise in the 
threat of terrorism. Admittedly, this threat in Niger is not like that of Mali, where the 
entire northern region has been occupied and remains under threat, but the presence of 
Nigerien citizens in criminal and terrorist groups is a concern to be taken seriously.188 
Not to mention also that Islamic religious terrorism can mutate relatively quickly in other 
forms under another cover. The violence of the Islamist sect Boko Haram, despite its 
weakening by the joint intervention of the Nigerian, Chadian and Nigerian armies in 
2015, continues to spread throughout the border area with Nigeria, including the region 
of Diffa and Lake Chad. It is the same in the northern region for AQIM and ANSAROU 
Belmoktar which contribute to the violence and rooting of cross-border insecurity in 
Niger and its neighboring countries such as Mali and Burkina Faso.189 
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Algeria: 
In Algeria, for example, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) operates in 
two groups, one performing most of the operational missions in northern Algeria; the 
other, to the south, being active in smuggling (weapons and other material) on behalf of 
the northern organization, as shown by the repeated seizures of large quantities of 
weapons on the southern and eastern borders of Algeria.190 AQIM operates in the 
southern Sahara where it develops an “Islamist police” of traditional trade routes, 
demanding money against the protection of smugglers, as well as weapons and logistical 
equipment, thus associated with a huge flow of illicit goods in direction of northern 
Algeria. A growing number of fighters from sub-Saharan African states are participating 
in AQIM’s activities. AQIM’s need to expand its activities in the Sahel is motivated inter 
alia by its inability to maintain regular recruitment among Algerians. AQIM has forged 
increased cooperation with Mauritanian, Malian, Nigerian fighters which has allowed it 
to expand its support networks, including social support for recruitment, financial 
support, and the use of criminal networks. AQIM is not in a position to destabilize one of 
the states in the region, but the fact that it is able to attract additional populations poses a 
threat to regional security.191 
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To sum up, there is no doubt that Western Europe has become at the heart of the 
battle, and an integral part of the Middle East crisis, turning it into a terrorist that is 
crossing borders, states and religions. Recent attacks in the Belgian capital, Brussels, 
reflected the worst fears of the European intelligence and police, and although they were 
waiting for them, they failed to prevent them, to prove the failure of the West’s strategy 
in the face of terrorism. Attacks are a natural result of a group of factors that have arisen 
in a single moment. First, the collapse of the EU borders in front of the recent waves of 
refugees, mined by unknown numbers of terrorists, loaded with potential reservoirs. The 
collapse of the border, due to the inability to protect it, is only a harvest of the policies of 
European and Western countries, which caused a serious imbalance in the world, 
exacerbated the problem of migration and contributed to the increase in the number of 
refugees. 
Second, the repeated failure of the European Preventive Security, from the attack 
of Charlie Hebdo, to the recruitment of  terrorists and facilitation of their training, 
arming, funding and then crossing into Syria, rather than the end of the recent attacks, 
where they planned and moved into several countries and then carried out, without any 
success from the part of security services to uncover and thwart their plans. In addition, 
the use of security solutions to address the problem of migration and migrants was 
doomed to fail, but rather to the dilemma because most of the migrants were classified as 
potential terrorists. Western Europe was plunged into political, security, social and moral 
crises that prompted more of its citizens to join terrorist groups. There is no doubt that 
Western Europe’s preoccupation with new refugees as a potential terrorist threat is a 
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serious distraction from the violent extremism that is growing within Western Europe 
itself, since the Paris attackers were mostly Belgian or French citizens. The roots of 
extremism are complex but partly related to the social isolation imposed on migrant 
communities. 
On the other hand, the political systems of the North Africa/ Sahel region between 
Libya, Chad, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso are known to spread corruption, a lack of 
democracy, and a severe weakening of institutional governance. Most of these countries 
do not have effective control over their geographical borders, and even most of their 
national territory, making them an authority over the capital and its surroundings. This is 
at a time when the societies of the North African and Sahel region are experiencing very 
difficult economic and social conditions, which in turn have produced new phenomena 
linked to terrorism and organized crime. 
Furthermore, terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda and Al Murabitoun 
benefited from organized crime and the international arms trade, as well as from the 
collapse of the regional regime with the fall of Muammar Gaddafi and its security and 
military regime in Libya, as well as the disintegration of power in Mali. This new 
situation strengthened the network of terrorist groups in North Africa, particularly in 
Tunisia and Libya, as well as in the Sahel from Mali to Niger. It was further complicated 
by the arrival of anti-tank missiles by terrorist groups and by the helicopters used by 
these organizations in Mali and elsewhere. In short, it can be said that terrorism has 
become a reality in the North Africa and the Sahel region, a combination of domestic and 
international factors makes it a threat on its way to recovery, not blockade. 
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CHAPTER V– COMPARTIVE CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
The Sahel region of Africa is witnessing activities of groups, factions and 
brigades operating under the umbrella of Al Qaeda. Some of these battalions have 
advocated the Islamist State, all of which pose a threat to North/West Africa’s security 
and regional and international security. The countries of Western Europe remain obsessed 
with North/West Africa because of the waves of migration across the coast of Libya 
towards Italy and Spain, which are also linked to the chaos in Libya.  
In this chapter, both Western Europe and North/ West Africa case studies will be 
examined in the same fashion, with examination of the motivations and tactics of the 
criminal and terrorist organizations in each country under consideration presented 
structurally in the same fashion for each case. For each of those countries, the 
motivations, objectives and tactics employed by each of the criminal and terrorist 
organizations under consideration will be presented in turn. The categories of motivations 
objective and tactics will be divided into categories focusing on economic, ideological, 
military, religious, ethnic, and political issues areas. 
Analysis of the Case Study of Western Europe 
Economic Issues: 
One of the primary objectives of terrorism is to strike people psychologically, 
beyond the serious human and material damage directly caused by the attacks. From this 
point of view, the attacks perpetrated in Western Europe by the terrorist groups seem to 
have reached their ends more deeply than one might think: by modifying the economic 
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behavior of individuals, the harshness of the images they conveyed has indirectly 
weighed on European growth, says research center Rand Europe, based in Cambridge and 
Brussels.192 In a study commissioned by the European Parliament and conducted in the 
28 member countries of the Union, between 2004 (the year of the bombing of Al Qaeda 
in Madrid transportations, the deadliest so far in Europe with 191 dead and more than 
1,800 injured) and 2016, terrorism has cost 180 billion euros to the European Union, thus, 
showing the direct negative effect of these operations on GDP.193 
Ideological Issues: 
 Since the launch of the waves of illegal migration towards European Union (EU) 
member states since 2015 to date, Western European States have witnessed a state of 
security preparedness, warning and deployment of troops on the ground, as well as 
occasional warnings by the European intelligence services, to become more routine 
procedure than was previously the case.194 Western Europe may have succeeded in 
maintaining its external borders and preventing the return of foreign fighters, but that 
does not mean the end of security threats by Islamist extremist groups who take the fields 
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of Europe, as staging points for spreading extremist ideology and providing logistical 
support to different groups whom they are affiliated with  such as the Islamic State.195 
 Violent extremism remains the most difficult challenge for Western Europe from 
within, which needs expertise in the fields of sociology and psychology, combating 
extremism and the removal of extremist ideology. The European Police Agency 
(Europol) reported on June 21, 2018 that terrorist attacks against European targets more 
than doubled in 2017. The agency warned against the danger the Islamic State attacking 
Europe, although it is less developed than its predecessors.196 
Military Issues: 
 The European Union Police Agency (EUROPOL) has always warned that the 
Islamic State is seeking to intensify attacks on European targets following the marked 
territorial, resource and personnel losses it has sustained in Iraq and Syria since 2017.197 
Europol reports revealed that more foreign fighters will try to return to Western Europe, 
where there will be several dozens of these fighters capable of carrying out attacks, 
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including their plans to launch car bombs, kidnappings and extortion, but the Europol 
report has reduced the likelihood of attacks on installations as vital as nuclear sites.198  
 The British Interior Ministry predicted in June 2018 that the threat posed by 
terrorism will remain at its current high level, for at least two years, and the British Prime 
Minister Theresa May in September 2017 confirmed that the level of terrorist threat in the 
country would remain at the “Dangerous” level, which means there is a high probability 
of an attack, indicating that the level will remain under consideration in the light of 
continued investigations into terrorist operations.199 Mark Rowley, the United Kingdom’s 
senior counterterrorism officer, said in February 2018 that Britain faces a new and 
significant threat of terrorism, and Britain is a major target for local and foreign Islamist 
extremists.200  
Religious Issues: 
 The European Centre for Countering-Terrorism and Intelligence Studies has 
reached the fact that French intelligence, perhaps the most European Intelligence Agency, 
has issued warning reports of possible terrorist attacks and concerns about the return of 
foreign fighters and their families to France, as well as British and Belgian 
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intelligence.201 The number of reports from the European Centre issued in 2017 revealed 
that the French intelligence service had been reporting throughout the year, reflecting the 
fears and concerns of French intelligence.202 Furthermore, the Belgian state Security 
Service warned on January 29, 2018 of the security consequences of penetrating 
extremist groups of the Muslim community in Belgium. It drew attention to the risk of 
growing “Salafist groups and initiatives” in the country and the possibility of becoming a 
social problem that threatens Western values and democracy in the country.203 
The actions of Western European States are almost identical in response to the 
phenomenon of terrorism, which has seen international concern, the fact that the 
European continent can be described as one of the generators of extremist and militant 
movements. For example, Belgium is an important part of Western Europe, and Belgium 
is a small country that has produced large numbers of extremists who joined the ranks of 
the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq relative to the geographical area and population 
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involved. Some 450 people have been charged with European citizenship in the ranks of 
the Islamic State.204 
Ethnic Issues: 
The actions, taken by Western Europe with regard to migration issues or check-in 
and out of Europe, were a successful process that controlled the movement of these 
militant groups within Europe. For example, France and Denmark “have cited security 
concerns as justification for their reluctance in accepting migrants from the Middle East 
and North Africa, particularly in the wake of the Paris and Copenhagen terrorist 
shootings in early 2015”.205 Belgium, of course, had been more assertive on the subject, 
and had positively reflected on the Belgian citizen, with his sense of satisfaction, whether 
he was a Dutch or French speaker, and the Belgian citizen was reassured that there was a 
limit to the expansion of such movements.  
As for the underlying causes, one of the most important of these is the identity 
crisis, which resulted in the European Community because of the presence of three 
jihadist groups, the first of Arab origin, the second children of Arab immigrants, the third 
entered into Islam recently. The first group is experiencing a severe identity crisis, where 
they had to choose between the merger Assimilation into the host society, or to remain 
resident in the indigenous culture to which their parents are raised, if one chooses to bias 
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the Western culture, it changes its appearance, and those who choose the indigenous 
culture do the opposite.206 
Political Issues: 
Some believe that terrorism in Europe was caused by the adoption of policies of 
integration or defamation of identity by Western European countries, free expression of 
culture and politics, the tendency to unite nationalism, and non-cultural pluralism, such as 
the United Kingdom, which allowed for religious and cultural pluralism.207 The impact of 
historical accumulations in the field of security concepts of identity, a quasi-subjective 
conviction of the majority of European public opinion, that multiculturalism is indeed a 
structural problem with a pressing weight on the internal balance of Western Europe, and 
the problem has been determined by the difficulty of integrating immigrant groups into 
the systems of democratic societies, especially those who are challenged by dogmatism 
and who congregate in organizational forms that are incompatible with the democratic 
approach of Western European institutions. 
In order to face the challenges posed by migration in its cultural dimension, 
Western European States have adopted schemes, that will alleviate the cultural and nodal 
conflicts, between the majority (indigenous population) and the minority (immigrant 
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groups). These are all policies that have made a fundamental purpose which is the control 
of the political and social dynamism of the migratory communities on the European 
soil.208 
Analysis of the Case Study of the Sahel of North/West Africa 
Military Issues: 
The Sahel region of North/West Africa is threatened by several terrorist groups, 
with roots dating to Al Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks. Analysts focused their attention on Al 
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and its links to Al Shabab organization and the Nigerian 
Boko Haram group.209 It is interesting to note that the terrorist attacks in Africa do not 
receive due attention from international public opinion. In fact, media rallied around the 
globe when the terrorist attacks on the headquarters of the French newspaper Charlie 
Hebdo took place, as leaders of individual and group countries rushed to Paris to show 
sympathy and deep sorrow for the deaths.210 At the same time as the crime of Paris, the 
city of Baga, Nigeria, witnessed a bloody massacre by the Boko Haram gangs, in which 
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about 150 civilians and soldiers.211 However, no one raised the slogan “all of us are 
Baga” in comparison to the slogan “all of us are Charlie”. 
 The growing concern of a terrorist threat in the Sahel is evident since 2001 and is 
clear from the escalation of violent attacks by extremist armed groups such as Al Qaeda 
in the Islamic Maghreb, Boko Haram group, Ansar Al Sharia, the Tawhid movement in 
West Africa and Al Shabab group of Somalia and the Organization of the Islamic State in 
Libya.212 The announcement of the Caliphate, in the specific sense, is that the link 
between these extremist groups is clear and growing in a sacred alliance with the 
movements that share their opinion, as well as a strange coalition based on trafficking, 
kidnapping and violent extremism.  
Moreover, these transnational terrorist networks are expanding significantly from 
hot spots in the Middle East, especially Syria and Iraq to the Sahel region of North/ West 
Africa, which poses a great threat to the people and countries of the region as a whole.213 
The loss of terrorist groups by the army and the gradual weakening of its political and 
religious discourse in Algeria, thanks to the war against terrorism and increased 
awareness among the population, led to its re-deployment and the polarization of ex-
combatants who fought in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. 
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According to the Global Terrorism Index in 2014, there has been a significant 
increase in the number of terrorist attacks in the Sahel region of North/West Africa: 
“Nigeria experienced the biggest year-on-year increase in deaths ever recorded with 
5,662 more people being killed, an over 300 per cent increase.”214 Boko Haram, 
Mujahideen and AQIM groups are the most dangerous terrorist networks in West Africa, 
and their operations have killed thousands of people in the last two years. Boko Haram 
seems to be a real regional threat, threatening the security of Cameroon, Niger, Chad and 
Nigeria. Some 13,000 people have been killed and about 1 million displaced by Boko 
Haram violence since 2009.215 
Ethnic Issues: 
The African Sahel region has been found to be a breeding ground for stability and 
unemployed young recruits. In fact, since the beginning of the millennium, the Sahel has 
become a strategic area for terrorist movements in an uncontrolled geographical area 
where most of the countries are exposed to ongoing violence and conflicts such as the 
Tuaregs’ oppression in Mali, Niger and internal conflicts in West Africa.216 In addition to 
the border disputes, sudden conflicts and the deteriorating situation in recent years due to 
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drought and poverty and the lack of political systems. In short, the region is witnessing a 
situation close to chaos, which is not improving and affects the ability of countries to 
combat security risks. 
Political Issues: 
 The weakness of the countries in the world is a serious threat to them and others 
and applies to the countries of the African Sahel region, which is comprised of corrupt 
and failed states unable to effectively control their territory and ensure security. They 
lack effective state agencies. The fragility of the countries of the region is a potential 
breeding ground for terrorist groups and smugglers who have infiltrated into the region. 
In fact, these countries are impoverished for several reasons: Absence of investments and 
economic conditions lagging behind unemployment and poverty. Most countries in the 
region are unable to perform their duties.217 
The absence of a state in this region is a boon to Al Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb, because it strengthens its presence in the region and creates chaos in order for it 
to be able to function with magnificence. All activities of terrorist groups grow and thrive 
in a turbulent security environment starting with developing its operational capabilities, 
training, armament, recruiting, committing terrorist acts against states, institutions, 
citizens, and against neighboring countries and foreign nationals.218 The absence of the 
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state in the Sahel is also due to its inability to meet the basic needs of its citizens 
(education, health, food and economic and social opportunities) which led to a feeling of 
state alienation.  
 Economic Issues: 
 A group of experts was appointed, by the UN Secretary-General in 2004 to reflect 
on the security challenges of humanity, to lay the groundwork for a new collective 
security system. Infectious diseases and extreme poverty are threats themselves, “a 
breeding ground for other threats including civil conflicts”.219 Development indicators 
for countries that are at the heart of the work of terrorist groups in the African Sahel are 
among the lowest global rates and three of these countries suffer from poverty. In 
Mauritania, the World Development Index is ranked 159th, Mali was ranked 183th and 
Niger was ranked 189th.220 This allowed the terrorist movements to have permanent 
residence and to benefit from the chaos. 
 Ideological issues: 
 Certainly, the millions of dollars raised each year from kidnappings and drug 
trafficking allow for a significant number of criminal activities across national and 
terrorist groups and will certainly increase the extent of the threats and harm posed to 
 
Internazionali 2011, 2, accessed February 12, 2019, 
http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaiwp1107.pdf. 
219. “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility,” United Nations 2004, 
12, accessed February 12, 2019, 
http://www.un.org/ar/peacebuilding/pdf/historical/hlp_more_secure_world.pdf. 
220. “Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update,” 
UNDP, accessed February 12, 2019, 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/MLI.pdf. 
 91 
 
African societies. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has increased its presence in the 
Sahel of North and West Africa in particular, expanding into a significant threat rather 
than simply a nuisance. The inevitable result of this situation is the creation of a climate 
of insecurity and increased extremism and violence. The countries of the Sahel region are 
still attractive to drug trafficking through the previously mentioned reasons (porous 
borders, rampant corruption, poverty and underdevelopment). 
 Religious Issues: 
 It is necessary to distinguish Salafist ideology imported from abroad, and 
especially the Gulf countries, from traditional Islam which exists in Africa since the 8th 
century. The introduction and growing influence of controversial Shari'a interpretations is 
a frequently cited factor in the “radicalization” and recruitment of individuals into violent 
extremist groups such as in Mali and Mauritania.221 
 Furthermore, many Muslims who go to study in Arabic-speaking countries are 
struggling to find a job once they return to their country of origin because they do not 
master the official language. Discouraged and without resources, some do not hesitate to 
radicalize themselves and join extremist groups with whom it is easy for them to 
communicate.222 
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To sum up, in the Sahel region of North and West Africa, the overlap between 
terrorism and organized crime has become so strong that some analysts have argued that 
Al Qaeda transformation from criminality to terrorist financing is a cover to make money. 
Drug trafficking has become a major source of money for terrorist groups and 
organizations deployed in the Sahel region of North and West Africa. On the other hand, 
the reality observed in France or in Western Europe is quite different where the financing 
of terrorist attacks is showing, rather, links between terrorism and criminal law. The next 
section of this chapter compares and contrasts both the case studies of Western Europe 
and the Sahel region of North and West Africa to explain in depth the similarities and 
difference between each case. 
Similarities Between Western Europe and the Sahel Region 
For Western Europe, one can note that the perpetrators of the attacks were young 
criminals found in their involvement in the ranks of an organization calling for the rise to 
the status of senior criminals: 
- France/ Belgium: Cells that carried out Paris and Brussels attacks and the 
suspects who were later arrested included delinquents who were living in a 
state of rupture with the community and graduated as extremists from prisons. 
In addition, the link between terrorism and organized crime for Western 
Europe is seen where criminal gangs provide terrorist organizations with 
weapons, explosives and false identities, and terrorist groups also conduct 
drug trafficking, robbery and hate speech on social media sites. They do not, 
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also, hesitate to use the waves of refugees and immigrants to infiltrate their 
customers into European soil, as did the suicide bombers in France.  
- The United Kingdom: On March 22, 2017, a man rushes into the crowd with 
his vehicle on the Westminster Bridge before stabbing a police officer deadly 
in front of Parliament. The attack, claimed by the IS, killed five people. Its 
author, Khalid Masood, a 52 years old British citizen converted to Islam, is 
shot dead by the police.223 
- Spain: Persons detained for terrorist acts in Spain are mostly young people 
between the ages of 20 and 34, and men, who represent 83.1% of jihadists in 
Spain. Jihadist women, although minority, could become more and more 
numerous because of a campaign of mobilization of the Islamic States, 
especially directed towards them. Although the main motivation put forward 
by the detainees for their terrorist act is the Islamist ideology, the institute 
estimates that in only 11% of cases the knowledge of religious texts is 
relevant.224 
Similarly, one can observe that for the case study of the Sahel of North and West 
Africa, terrorists, from Boko Haram or other groups, recruit youngs mostly from the 
countries of the Sahel: 
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- Nigeria: Forced to retreat to the north in the areas of Lake Chad and the 
Cameroonian border, Boko Haram was forced to redefine its strategy: the 
multiplication of suicide bombings including the use of girls kamikazes and 
expansion of its field of action. action towards neighboring countries such as 
Niger, Cameroon and Chad. At issue, widespread poverty and youth 
unemployment in northern Nigeria, providing fertile ground for the 
recruitment of the Islamic sect through religious preachers.225 
- Mali: In the Malian context, especially in the occupation of the northern 
regions in 2012, terrorist groups came to occupy places in which people lived. 
These are the groups that joined youth whose engagement is very rarely the 
result of a process of religious indoctrination. If the young people found 
themselves involved, it is mainly for reasons related to logics of protection or 
basic economic logic. There is a desire to protect his livestock, there is 
pragmatism. 226 
- Niger: On Friday November 02, 2018, the Nigerian government adopted a bill 
amending the Penal Code to reintegrate the repented Boko Haram. To avoid 
 
225. UN News Centre, “Girls Groomed For Suicide Missions Fight Back Against 
The Extremists Of Lake Chad,” United Nations Africa Renewal, accessed June 06, 2019, 
https://www.un.org/africarenewal/news/girls-groomed-suicide-missions-fight-back-
against-extremists-lake-chad. 
226. Julien, Chongwang, “Q&R: Pourquoi Les Jeunes Rejoignent Les Groupes 
Armés Au Mali,” SCIDEV 2017, accessed June 06, 2019, https://www.scidev.net/afrique-
sub-saharienne/conflit/opinion/pourquoi-jeunes-rejoignent-groupes-armes-Mali.html. 
 95 
 
young people joining the ranks of the terrorist group, the authorities are trying 
to create a favorable economic and social environment.227 
- Algeria: After the two car bombings perpetrated on Tuesday December 11th, 
2007 in Algiers that left 37 dead, the Algerian police has been gradually 
providing information on the profile of the two terrorists who blew themselves 
up. One of them is Larbi Charef who is a young man of 30 from a poor 
neighborhood of the Algerian capital.228 
Furthermore, the activities of Boko Haram, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQIM), the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), and Ansar 
Dine also specialize in various trafficking (drugs, human beings ...) and organized 
crime worries. These movements maintain connections allowing them to support 
each other.229 
Differences Between Western Europe And the Sahel of North/West Africa 
 A look at the studies of International Transparency, which maps the corruption, 
reveals that corruption is important in North Africa but not very important in Western 
Europe: 
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- France: After the attacks of January 2015, an extraordinary meeting is organized 
in Paris at the initiative of France. It gives rise to the Paris Declaration of 11 
January, which takes shape in April 2015 with the adoption by the European 
Commission of a European Security Program.230 
- Belgium: The handover of Salah Abdeslam, in less than two months by Belgium 
to France, illustrated the effectiveness of the European Arrest Warrant. The 
vigilance against Islamist extremism remains in spite of the military defeat on the 
ground of the jihadist group, the Islamic State. 
- The United Kingdom: The plan of security aims to better share information from 
MI5 (British Home Intelligence) with the police or local authorities. The other 
priority reform is to improve, within the police and intelligence services, the use 
of data to detect threatening activities.231 
- Spain: The attacks in Madrid in 2004, and then in London in 2005, led to the 
adoption of a “European Union strategy to fight against terrorism”.232  
On the other hand, terrorism, or rather the rise of armed groups in the Sahel, is the 
consequence of a serious governance crisis affecting all of North and West Africa: 
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- Nigeria: It is on this ground that emerged in 2002 Boko Haram, in Maiduguri, the 
capital of the state of Borno, in the north-east of the country. Originally a simple 
sect, the movement has slipped to become a social movement denouncing poor 
governance, corruption of the politico-administrative elite and disparity of 
development between North and South.233 
- Mali/ Niger: The governance crisis is characterized by the disappearance of the 
state at the service of the people, because the modern state is privatized by the 
political elites for their benefit. These states both have in common a mined 
political system, monopolized by a predatory elite whose methods have not only 
carried the blow to what was left of the state and its administration, but also 
brought organized crime to the very heart of power.234  
- Algeria: This state is too repressive or ineffective in its fight against terrorism. It 
is a country with corrupt and authoritarian political power, denying its citizens the 
exercise of their fundamental rights. This increases evidence of the risks in this 
area. The economic decline and the rise of inequalities go in the same direction.235 
Furthermore, in a Sahelian territory wider than Europe, the process of ensuring 
concomitant security and development is extraordinarily complex. In terms of border 
security for Western Europe, thanks to the European Union (EU) that member states have 
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tools to better share their information in complete security and respect for the protection 
of personal data. The Schengen Information System, set up in 1995 between the member 
states that are parties to the Schengen Convention, facilitates the sharing of information 
on the persons or objects sought. This tool is used in external border checks to verify 
whether the person checked has been flagged in the system by a member state as wanted 
or dangerous.236  
On the other hand, the nature of conflicts in the Sahel region is interconnected and 
complex which often leads to the outbreak of other conflicts. These situations have 
reflected the strength and cohesion of the Sahelian countries, which has made the 
countries of the region, known for their weak border controls, to the imposition of 
security administration on its territory237. This leads to the ease of organized criminal 
activity and the ease of communication between non-national criminal organizations. 
This is mainly due to the bankruptcy of the state, which contributed primarily to the tribal 
system that governs many countries of the region which worked and is working to create 
chaos and division between factions.238 
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Conclusion 
To sum up, for both Western Europe and the Sahel region of North and West 
Africa, there is an interconnection between jihadist groups and criminal networks. In the 
case of the Sahel region of North Africa and West Africa, jihadist groups finance 
themselves in a number of ways through their relations with tribal and local communities 
in the region, a transit zone for legal and illegal products between the Mediterranean and 
West Africa. Jihadist groups operate on these roads, sometimes benefiting from financial 
arrangements with local criminals who provide convoy security. Kidnappings are another 
source of income. For Western Europe, the practices that different terrorist used to 
finance their operations include armed robbery (as Mohamed Merah did in particular), 
consumer scams (as Amedy Coulibaly and Hayat Boumedienne have done), and illegal 
trade (as the Kouachi brothers did). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 100 
 
CHAPTER VI- CONCLUSIONS 
Introduction 
This thesis addresses the following research question: Under what conditions do 
violent terrorist groups driven by extreme Islamist ideology collaborate with organized 
criminal enterprises to generate the requisite resources to pursue their strategic 
objectives? Given that question, it assesses the extent of the validity of the following 
hypothesis/central argument: As Islamist extremist terrorist groups’ financial needs 
increase, they are more likely to use collaboration with organized criminal enterprises, 
relative to other sources, as their principal means of funding. It, also, assesses the extent 
of the validity of the hypothesis through a comparative analysis of the Western European 
cases to include France, Belgium, the United Kingdom and Spain and the African Sahel 
region cases of Nigeria, Mali, Niger, and Algeria. 
This chapter is organized in the following manner: Introduction, Assessment of 
Extent of Validity of Central Argument, Limitations of Thesis and Suggestion for Future 
Research, and Policy Recommendations. 
The question of the financing of terrorism arose immediately after Al Qaeda’s 
attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001.239 According to official 
sources, the terrorists had used the financial circuit to raise money for the purpose of 
perpetrating the attacks. Money central to financing any war effort, terrorists fund their 
 
239. “The Global Regime for Terrorism,” CFR 2011, accessed December 16, 
2018, https://www.cfr.org/report/global-regime-terrorism. 
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activities on a global scale.240 This financing of terrorism comes from different horizons 
but one of the most serious threats is its link with money laundering. 
Theft, drug trafficking, kidnappings and a range of other crimes are examples of 
ways terrorist groups raise money that is then employed both for the recruitment of new 
members and the organizations and prosecution of attacks. Money laundering and 
terrorist financing are thus linked and present similar points. By their very nature, they 
are secret activities with both domestic and international components. Yet, the financing 
of terrorism differs from the usual patterns of money laundering where criminals must 
find a way to launder their illicit profits. Indeed, terrorist financing sources can be both 
legal and illegal, unlike money laundering, which is still of an illegal nature. 
Assessment of Extent of Validity of Central Argument 
The central argument of this thesis is as follows: As Islamist extremist terrorist 
groups’ financial needs increase, they are more likely to use collaboration with organized 
criminal enterprises, relative to other sources, as their principal means of funding. It was 
assessed by showing one of the most important questions about the link between crime 
and terrorism which is how the criminal past contributes to the process of radicalization, 
such as how the background, experiences, and the history of individuals, to include the 
networks they are exposed to lead them to turn to Islamist extremism and turn into 
violence. The profiles and routes recorded in the database suggest that the Islamist State’s 
 
240. Eben, Kaplan, “Tracking Down Terrorist Financing,” CFR 2006, accessed 
December 16, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/tracking-down-terrorist-financing. 
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discourse is perfectly in tune with the needs and personal aspirations of criminals and can 
serve as an incentive or a deterrent to continuing engagement in criminal activities.241 
For Western Europe, the Islamist State follows the same reasoning. The most 
famous example being that of Khalid Zerkani, a Belgian member of Daesh responsible 
for recruiting and mobilizing up to 72 foreign terrorist fighters. After his radicalization, 
Zarkani used his criminal “skills” (and his immense charisma) to recruit young men as 
foreign terrorist fighters, whom he encouraged to commit robberies and attacks, justified 
by religious motives.242 
As has been indicated previously, terrorism is traditionally distinct from 
organized international crime. Consequently, a distinct legal approach to regulate of these 
two forms of crime is essential.243 However, the evolution of these two phenomena, and 
in particular the paths followed by the new terrorism, suggest that these two forms of 
crime are closer than envisaged, as suggested by recent methods and practices of the 
Islamic State, but also other jihadist terrorist groups (like Boko Haram or Al Shabab). 
These new terrorist organizations resort to traditional criminal practices such as theft and 
extortion, while pursuing a primary objective of political and economic control by 
adopting new methods similar to those used for this purpose by any criminal 
 
241. Gábor, Böröndi, “Defence Review,” The Central Journal Of The Hungarian 
Defence Forces 146, no. 1: 7, accessed February 13, 2019, 
https://honvedelem.hu/files/files/112426/dr_2018_1_beliv_angol_szemle.pdf. 
242. Didier, Leroy, “La Belgique Et Daech: État Des Lieux,” IRSD, accessed 
February 13, 2019, http://www.irsd.be/website/images/livres/rmb/14/bmt53-56.pdf. 
243. “Similarities And Differences Between Organized Crime And Other Forms 
Of Crime,” UNODC 2018, accessed February 13, 2019, 
https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/organized-crime/module-1/key-issues/similarities-and-
differences.html.  
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organization.244 Thus, the Islamic State’s internal hierarchical military structure, in 
accordance with the “caliphate” proclaimed on the territory which he controls, is different 
from the horizontal structure, made up of autonomous cells, which are generally found in 
older terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda. 
In fact, the participation of terrorist groups in the drug trade should not be 
understood as an ideological contradiction or as a move towards a total fusion of the two 
types of criminal groups, especially if one knows that jihadist groups accept this 
participation in drug trafficking if they are sold to infidels but not to Muslims. Therefore, 
in addition to being seen as a vital source of revenue for terrorist groups from all 
continents, resulting in a wedded of convenience between the two activities, drug 
trafficking has become a powerful tool for realizing other crucial objectives of terrorist 
groups. Most worrying, however, is the fact, as studies have shown, that a significant 
proportion of those involved in terrorist attacks in Western Europe, in the last six years at 
least, have previously participated in various forms of crime and in particular to small 
drug trafficking, without being sentenced to prison or any other penalty.  
The challenge of combating terrorist financing lies in locating money that has a 
clean source or minimal. The transfer of funds is carried out through the banking system 
as well as parallel money remittance systems such as “hawala” which consists of 
 
244. Dominic, Dudley, “The Deadliest Terrorist Groups In The World Today,” 
Forbes 2018, accessed February 13, 2019, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/dominicdudley/2018/12/05/deadliest-terrorist-groups-in-
the-world/#566069872b3e. 
 104 
 
circulating the money in a network of stockbrokers “hawaladars”.245 A client gives a sum 
of money to one of these agents, who contacts the agent closest to the recipient and asks 
him to pay this amount in exchange for a promise of future repayment. 
This system works without transmission of means of payment, it relies entirely on 
the trust existing between the agents of the network. As it does not depend on the legal 
application of contracts, this system operates outside of a legal framework. There is no 
centralized register, and past transactions have no trace, and the only information 
necessary for its smooth operation is the maintenance of the total amount of current debt 
between each agent of the network. Debts can be settled in several ways depending on the 
wishes of the agents.246 
For a more effective fight, GIABA also collaborates with other partners within the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) network. Building the capacity of African countries, 
to fight terrorism by improving financial intelligence services, is becoming a necessity.247 
The prevention of abuse by non-profit organizations and the introduction of anti-money 
laundering measures and money-changers must be of particular concern to decision-
makers. 
 
245. “Money Laundering And Financial Crimes,” U.S STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE 1999, accessed December 12, 2018, 
https://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/1999/928.htm. 
246. “Risks And Methods Of Money Laundering And Terrorist Financing,” 
accessed December 16, 2018, 
http://learningmatrixatcampus.co.in/COURSES_DATA/IMSContent/Anti%20Money%2
0Laundering%20Srilanka-Lesson3240/AMLSL/Files/PDF/Chapter_2.pdf. 
247. Attila, Bugyaki, “The Most Significant International Groups and Institutions 
Taking Part in the Fight against Money Laundering and Financing Terrorism,” AARMS 
16, no.3(2017):151, accessed December 16, 2018, https://www.uni-nke.hu/document/uni-
nke-hu/AARMS_2017_03_10Bugyaki.pdf. 
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In December 2008, Boubacar Gaoussou Diarra, director of CAERT already spoke 
of alarming signals about the links between terrorism and organized crime. According to 
him, the question that arises is how to ensure the stability of political institutions, the 
security of States and populations of the African continent and especially how to protect 
economies from the perversion of organized crime. He also wondered how to prevent 
Africa from serving as a “backbone” or source of funding for terrorists.248 
Organized crime, money laundering and the financing of terrorism undermine the 
integrity of the political and judicial systems, the stability and prosperity of States.249 
Therefore, the continent of Africa, for example, becomes an easy target not only for 
money laundering but also for the financing of terrorism. The predominance of cash in 
the financial transactions of young African economies and the prevalence of informal 
channels carry risks.250 The states of the Sahel must reflect on ways to prevent the 
proliferation of terrorist networks such as AQMI. This Islamist group finances its 
 
248. Salima, Tlemçani, “Boubacar Gaoussou Diarra. Directeur du Centre Africain 
D'Étude Sur Le Terrorisme (Caert): 
“L'évolution Du Terrorisme Nécessite Une Nouvelle Stratégie De Lute”,” DJAZAIRESS 
2008, https://www.djazairess.com/fr/elwatan/90950. 
249. “Declaration On Strenthening Good Governance And Combating 
Corruption, Money-Laundering And The Financing Of Terrorism,” OSCE 2012, accessed 
December 17, 2018, https://www.osce.org/cio/97968?download=true. 
250. Zaquiah, Lartey, “Money Laundering In West Africa And Its Implications 
For Subregional Security,” UNIVERSITY OF GHANA 2016, 30, accessed December 17, 
2018, 
http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh/bitstream/handle/123456789/23537/Money%20Laundering%20
In%20West%20Africa%20and%20Its%20Implications%20for%20Sub-
Regional%20Security.pdf. 
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activities using methods such as kidnapping and ransom demand, hostage-taking, 
racketeering, the drug trade and smuggling.251  
In the context of the fight against the financing of terrorism in West Africa, a 
model framework law has been adopted so that all Member States can adapt it in their 
laws in the West African And Monetary Union (WAEMU) area.252 Some countries have 
incorporated it into their legislation quickly. For example, Benin has a National Cell of 
Financial Information Processing (NCFIP) that functioned belatedly, while that of 
Senegal, operational for some time, gives convincing results.253 
The role of NCFIP is to collect, analyze and process financial information specific 
to establishing the origin of the transactions, or the nature of the transactions subject to 
the declarations of suspicion of the taxable persons. They have extended the scope of 
their mission to the fight against the financing of terrorism, which shows that the link 
between the two threats is worrying. Benin, like most countries in West Africa, is a 
 
251. Minwoo, Yun, “Hostage Taking and Kidnapping in Terrorism: Predicting 
The Fate Of A Hostage,”PURDUE GLOBAL 2, no. 1: 1, accessed December 17, 2018, 
https://campus.purdueglobal.edu/documentstore/docs09/pdf/picj/vol2/issue1/Hostage_Ta
king_and_Kidnapping_in_Terrorism.pdf. 
252. Amadou, Sy & Mariama, Sow, “Four Questions On The State Of The West 
African Economic and Monetary Union And Implications For Other Regional Economic 
Communities,” BROOKINGS 2016, accessed December 17, 2018, 
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of-the-west-african-economic-and-monetary-union-and-implications-for-other-regional-
economic-communities. 
253. Alexandra, Kulovics, “Money Laundering in West Africa: An Analysis,” 
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO 2009, 24, accessed December 17, 2018, 
https://mfacc.utoronto.ca/sites/files/difa/public/shared/Program/ResearchProjects/DIFA2
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signatory to several conventions on money laundering and the financing of terrorism.254 
Money laundering is a crime under the WAEMU uniform law.255 
West Africa remains a fragile zone because of the large number of countries that 
are shaken by conflicts or political crises. It is an enabling environment for organized 
crime because of multiple instabilities.256 There seems to be a correlation between money 
laundering and the financing of terrorism, which makes, this area, a heaven for terrorist 
movements. Strengthening cooperation between countries is becoming an emergency as 
well as a greater role for regional organizations (WAEMU, AU, NCFIP) in the fight 
against these new threats. Mali, Mauritania and Niger in particular have been affected by 
the issue of terrorism. This situation can be explained by their geographical position and 
their common borders with the Maghreb, zone of origin of the Islamic group AQIM.257 
Limitations of Thesis and Suggestions for Future Research 
Regarding the organizational structure for both terrorists and organized criminal 
groups, the concept of the network, which is mentioned in this thesis is ineffective in 
 
254. Ibid, 24. 
255.  “Uniform Law on the Fight Against Money Laundering in Member States of 
the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU),” BOSTON UNIVERSITY, 
accessed December 17, 2018, http://www.bu.edu/bucflp-fig/laws/uniform-law-on-the-
fight-against-money-laundering-in-member-states-of-the-west-african-economic-and-
monetary-union-waemu. 
256. Alexandre, Marc et al, “Responding To The Challenge Of Fragility And 
Security In West Africa,” Berkeley  2015, 1, accessed December 18, 2018, 
http://cega.berkeley.edu/assets/miscellaneous_files/85-ABCA_-
Responding_to_the_Challenge_of_Fragility_and_Security_in_West_Africa_ABCA_entr
y.pdf. 
257. Zachary, Laub & Jonathan, Masters, “Al-Qaeda In The Islamic Maghreb,” 
Council On Foreign Relations 2015, accessed December 18, 2018, 
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understanding the degree of violence and the shift in the use of political violence by 
certain individuals. In future studies, it is essential to understand the organizational form 
from various geographical, financial and human constraints (number of activists, 
experience). 
Furthermore, the thesis did not treat organized crime concerns and the nature of 
the threat it poses to the state. In future research, it is recommended to explore how 
criminal organizations are more interested in exploiting the weaknesses of state control 
over the economy and how they use the deficiencies of the implementation of the 
prohibitions. Finally, this thesis used a comparative case study approach between 
Western Europe and the Sahel of north and West Africa without suggesting the way in 
which Europe can guarantee a sustainable development to ensure a just and equitable 
public security to the countries of the Sahel. For future research, it is recommended to 
study the various challenges facing the Sahel population and what the European 
Community is required to do for them, because the security and development of the Sahel 
means Europe enjoying stability and being free of terrorism. 
Policy Recommendations 
Certainly, terrorism is a constant threat to peace, security and stability, and there 
is no justified justification for the terrorist acts, and they are always condemned 
regardless of the circumstances and the alleged motives. Therefore, it is important to 
solidify the values of understanding, tolerance, dialogue, pluralism, acquaintance among 
people, and rapprochement between cultures, to reject the logic of the clash of 
civilizations, and to fight every ideology that calls for hatred, incites violence and 
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warrants terrorist crimes which cannot be accepted in any religion or law. It is also 
important to emphasize the role of the media, civil institutions and education systems in 
developing strategies to address the terrorists’ claims and to encourage the media to 
establish guidelines for media and press reports, so as to prevent terrorists from 
benefiting from them in communication, recruitment or otherwise. 
Further, the United Nations is required to develop standards to help charities and 
non-profit humanitarian organizations in their role of organizing relief and humanitarian 
work and to prevent exploitation of individuals through illegal activities. Increased 
cooperation at the national and bilateral levels is needed to coordinate between the 
agencies that specialize in countering terrorism, money laundering, weapons testing, 
explosives and drug trafficking in order to exchange expertise and experience, including 
training to ensure effectiveness in combating terrorists and their links to organized crime. 
Also, strengthening international action is crucial to preventing terrorists from acquiring 
weapons of mass destruction to support the UN role in this area, including the full 
implementation of Security Council resolution 1540. 
Developing national legislation and procedures is suggested to prevent terrorists 
from exploiting the laws of asylum and immigration to obtain safe haven or use the 
territory of countries as bases for recruitment, training, planning, or incitement to carry 
out terrorist operations against other countries. Also, it is important to focus on the 
phenomenon of juvenile delinquency from being prey to favorable criminal and terrorist 
organizations and to take concrete and specific counter measures to protect them from 
being the victim of these criminals. It is paramount to take effective, firm and urgent 
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measures to prevent and combat criminal activities committed by deterring the promotion 
of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and to promote universal compliance with 
international instruments, covenants and treaties relating to the fight against terrorism. 
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